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# Near East/North Africa Report

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## NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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## EEC MIDEAST INITIATIVE MAY HELP ARABS

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 23, 8 Jun 81 pp 2-3

[Text]

Britain's Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington is widely tipped as the man who will launch a European initiative towards a Middle Eastern peace settlement when Britain takes over the Presidency of the EEC at the end of this month. But in a speech in London last week to the Middle East Association, Lord Carrington did not conceal the limitations that such an initiative will face. "Let no one doubt the importance of the Americans' role in the search for peace," he declared, adding that the Europeans would not seek to undermine American efforts in the Middle East.

Since these American efforts seem to consist in rather lukewarm support for the Camp David process and a determination to press forward with setting up a Rapid Deployment Force for the Gulf whether the Arabs living there approve or not, there was little for Arabs to cheer in that part of Lord Carrington's speech. But it was not all bad news. Two strands of thought were to be seen in Lord Carrington's perceptions of the issues that are definitely more favourable for the Arabs.

These are 1) that the key to the security of the Gulf lies in a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and 2) that no settlement is possible without the Palestinians taking part in negotiations. The first of these positions is unwelcome in Washington and the second is anathema to the Reagan administration, wedded as it is to the concept of "strategic consensus" against Soviet penetration of the region and unquestioning endorsement of Israeli charges that the PLO is a gang of terrorists.

So, after all of the huffing and puffing about a European initiative, will it have any real substance when it finally emerges into the light of day? This newsletter is not to be found among those who doubt the importance of the Americans, much as we disagree with what seems to us strategic nonsense. Even so, the picture

may not be as stark as it certainly looks at present from a vantage-point in the Arab world.

No European initiative, however unequivocal it might be, can be decisive in the Middle East. Nonetheless, even the dimmest of White House policy-making luminaries is likely to notice that American views are so markedly at variance with the ideas behind Lord Carrington's speech. And if, as seems increasingly probable, strategic consensus turns out to be an attempt to place a hard skin around a region rotted to the core by conflict and crisis and that it enhances rather than diminishes Moscow's influence, the penny may eventually drop.

If it does not, the next four years will be dangerous ones for Arab regimes friendly to the US. For these governments, half a European loaf may therefore be better than no bread. But it will be up to the Arabs to follow up the EEC initiative with one of their own. Otherwise, the European declaration will remain so much pious verbiage.

The European initiative sketched out by Lord Carrington is based on the pre-condition that the Palestinians and Israelis must recognise that each has legitimate rights. "This means that each side has to accept that negotiations can proceed only on such a basis," he explained.

Easier said than done. Moderate opinion both in Israel and inside the PLO would accept this pragmatic approach but the hard-liners in each camp most emphatically would not. By both word and deed, Menahem Begin has shown his hostility to the Palestinians and has seen the foundering fortunes of his Likud Bloc revive as a result. Indeed, a public opinion poll published last week in the *Jerusalem Post* showed he was likely to win 45 seats to Labour's 42 in the elections for the Knesset on June 30 with an excellent chance of forming a new coalition with other Israeli right-wing parties.

Among the Palestinians, moderation can be an extremely perilous cause. This was shown last week by the assassination by an unknown gunman of Naim Khader, the PLO's representative in Brussels. Dr Khader's influence on European thinking about the Middle East was acknowledged in the many tributes to him from European leaders.

At a higher level, there can be few better illustrations of the dangers of moderation than the split-personality performance of PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. There is a private Arafat who must face the facts and a public Arafat who must breathe fire in order to retain his hold on the levers of power inside the PLO. Merging the two Arafats into a single *persona* has never been easy, although the Palestinian leader did once attempt to do so in public with his "gun and olive branch" speech at the UN in 1974.

The EEC initiative presupposes that mutual recognition would be simultaneous and any other procedure would be unthinkable. Once again, this is far easier said than done. This is because non-recognition is the heart of the conflict. Once the Israelis accept in public that the Palestinians have inalienable rights and the PLO agrees that Israelis have a right to live in peace behind secure frontiers, all that remains to be negotiated are the details of a final agreement.

European diplomats could, of course, prove to be invaluable in helping the two sides to make such a traumatic move, especially if they have the assistance of pragmatic Arab governments. The question then remains: is it in the interests of these governments to go along with the Europeans? In the face of the mounting dangers that American policies are likely to create, the Arabs may find they have no other choice.

CSO: 4300/44

BRIEFS

QADHDHAFI, SADDAM HUSSEIN TALK--Tripoli, 17 Chaabane, 19 Jun (Jamahirya News Agency)--An important telephone conversation took place yesterday between the Guide of the Revolution and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein with a view to the mobilization of all the Arab potentialities to face up to the real enemy of the Arab world and Islam, which is halting the Arab march toward progress. The two men reached an agreement to put an end to Arab and Islamic secondary differences and stressed the need for aiming their weapons at the enemy. [Text] [Paris BULLETIN QUOTIDIEN DE L'AGENCE JAMAHIRYA-PRESS in French No 1118 19 Jun 81 p 1] 8143

QADHDHAFI, JORDAN'S HUSSEIN TALK--Tripoli, 17 Chaabane, 19 Jun (Jamahirya News Agency)--A telephone conversation has taken place between the Guide of the Revolution, Colonel Qadhafi, and King Hussein of Jordan with a view to mobilization of all the Arab potentialities to face up to the enemy of the Arab fatherland. The Guide of the Revolution called attention to the high level of understanding on the part of our brother Jordanians. [Text] [Paris BULLETIN QUOTIDIEN DE L'AGENCE JAMAHIRYA-PRESS in French No 1118 19 Jun 81 p 1] 8143

LIBYAN, YAR MEETING--Tripoli, 19 Chaabane, 21 Jun (Jamahirya News Agency)--The Libyan-Yemeni joint committee held its second meeting this morning in Tripoli. This meeting was devoted to examination of bilateral cooperation between the Jamahirya and the Yemen Arab Republic and to the means of developing this cooperation in all sectors, in accordance with the interests of the two brother peoples. The secretary of the People's General Committee for Planning and the Minister of Economy of the Yemen Arab Republic, who have been visiting the Jamahirya during the past few days, participated in this meeting. In a statement made to a correspondent of the Jamahirya News Agency at the end of the meeting, the Yemeni minister expressed his gratitude for the aid furnished by the Arab Libyan people to their brother Yemeni people. He also paid tribute to the firm and courageous positions taken by the Arab Libyan people with a view to the unification of Arab ranks and to the investment of all their potentialities in the confrontation with their common enemy. [Text] [Paris BULLETIN QUOTIDIEN DE L'AGENCE JAMAHIRYA-PRESS in French No 1118 19 Jun 81 p 1] 8143

CSO: 4519/18

ISLAMIC AFFAIRS

**GAMBIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON SAUDI-GAMBIAN RELATIONS**

GF122007 Riyadh Domestic Television Service in English 1830 GMT 12 Jul 81

[Text] Gambian External Affairs Minister Lamin Kiti Jabang has confirmed that the Saudi-Gambian relations are deep and strong and that this strength is derived from the Islamic relations which bind both countries. In a statement published today by AL-MADINAH newspaper, he has praised the participation of the kingdom in implementing some of the development projects in Gambia. Mr Kiti has pointed out that during his visit to the kingdom, he discussed a number of issues which will boost cooperation between both countries.

The Gambian minister has affirmed that the Saudi mediation between Morocco and Mauritania and the resumption of relations between them is a new proof, of the success of the quiet diplomacy of Saudi Arabia with the view of attaining Islamic solidarity.

Mr Lamin Kiti has denounced the Israeli aggression against Iraq's nuclear reactor and said that it is a violation of all international laws and is an obstacle to world peace. The Gambian external affairs minister has said that the Israeli aggression was launched against all Islamic countries and Arab and African sovereignty. He said that he cannot imagine the resumption of relations between Israel and Africa because of the Israeli defiance of the feelings, value and ideals of those people. The Gambian minister has also denounced the cooperation between Israel and South Africa because it is against world peace and the prosperity of the African continent. He then praised the outcome of the OAU Summit Conference held in Nairobi as it solved several problems of Africa such as the Western Sahara, the African horan and the problem of Chad.

CSO: 4300/42

ISLAMIC AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

DONATION TO AFGHAN REFUGEES--Habib Chatti, secretary general of the Islamic Conference Organization, today turned over a check for 50 million Saudi riyals to the Pakistani charge d'affaires in Jidda. This money is a donation from the Saudi people to the Afghan refugees to be conveyed through the Pakistani Government. On this occasion Habib Chatti lauded the continuous Saudi support for the Afghan people to bolster their steadfastness and enable them to achieve their legitimate right for self-determination. Mr Habib Chatti added that this is not the first time that the kingdom has supported and assisted the struggling Afghan people. It has made many contributions to these people through the Islamic Conference Organization out of its belief in Islamic solidarity and out of sincere service to Muslim causes. Mr Chatti reiterated the Islamic Conference Organization's ceaseless efforts to support the Afghan people until they achieve victory in their just cause. [Text] [GFO30510 Riyadh Domestic Television Service in Arabic 1930 GMT 2 Jul 81]

BAHRAINI AMIR RECEIVES MAURITANIA MESSAGE--Manama, 12 Jul (GNA)--Bahraini amir his highness Shaykh 'Isa Ibn Salman al Khalifah has received a written message from Mauritanian President Khouna Ould Haydala dealing with bilateral relations and current issues in the Arab Maghreb. The message was delivered by Mohammad Ould Hamed, adviser to the Mauritanian president, during a meeting with his highness tonight. The meeting was attended by Foreign Minister Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Mubarak al Khalifah and Interior Minister Muhammad Ibn Khalifah al Khalifah. In a statement after the meeting, Ould Hamed said that the message falls within the framework of the continuing consultations between the two leaders on the various issues that interest the Arab region. He added that his highness the amir of Bahrain showed understanding of the contents of the message dealing with farsighted opinions on the various issues pertaining to current Arab issues. The Mauritanian envoy arrived in Manama from Kuwait this morning as part of a tour of a number of states in the region to deliver similar messages to the leaders of these states. [Text] [JN122004 Manama Gulf News Agency in Arabic 1940 GMT 12 Jul 81]

CSO: 4304/57

ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS SIGNED BY GCC MEMBERS

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 225, 13 Jun 81 p 17

[Article: "The Gulf Council of Cooperation Does not Repeal Bilateral Agreements"]

[Text] Last Monday afternoon the ministers of finance and economy of the six countries of the Arabian Gulf Council of Cooperation [GCC] signed a draft mutual economic agreement between their countries which replaces the bilateral economic agreements that exist between these countries.

Although Mr 'Abdallah Bisharah, secretary general of the Gulf Council of Cooperation did state that this mutual economic agreement regulates economic relations between the member countries and is altogether unrelated to the outside world, observers are affirming that after this agreement is ratified by the leaders of the countries of the Gulf Council of Cooperation, the first effective and major economic bloc in the Gulf area or rather in the area as a whole will have been created. This will have significant effects on the world economy.

This was confirmed by the statement made by the Kuwaiti minister of finance, 'Abd-al-Latif al-Hamad following the conclusion of the Riyadh economic meetings. The Kuwaiti minister then said, "If the Gulf states form a strong economic bloc, that bloc will give them a stronger negotiating position opposite the other economic blocs. Such a strong economic bloc would also help the formulation of the policy of these countries as a group opposite the advanced economic countries."

The Saudi minister of finance and national economy, al-Shaykh Muhammad Aba al-Khayl stated, "The mutual economic agreement of the Arabian Gulf Council of Cooperation gives the citizens of the Gulf countries the full rights and privileges that are given to the citizens of the member countries regarding economic and commercial activities, the right of residence and [the right to] work. It would liberate trade between the member countries; it would remove customs fees from the goods that are traded; and it would give the means of transportation the privileges that are given to the national means of transportation.

"This agreement stipulates the coordination of national development plans; the coordination of all stages of the oil policy; the coordination of industrialization; and the establishment of industrial projects so as to do away with duplication or harmful competition. The agreement calls upon these countries to coordinate their public investments inside their countries and abroad. It also stipulates that these countries coordinate their policies regarding foreign aid."

Al-Shaykh Aba al-Khayl said in his statement that the agreement "also strives to standardize the progressive and banking systems of the member countries, and that includes standardizing the currency. This agreement will have its effect on the integrated economic growth of the countries of this area, and it will achieve the objectives of development in these countries because their economies are basically similar. Also the similarity of their geographic and human conditions will make cooperation in the field of mutual economic development easy to achieve and necessary at this time."

Although the Saudi minister of finance said that the agreement calls for coordination between the countries of the Council of Cooperation regarding these countries' oil policy, the present obvious disparity in the oil policies of the six Arabian Gulf countries regarding production and prices makes the matter difficult for the ministers of finance and economy. Therefore, as Mr 'Abdallah Bisharah said, to settle anything in this matter the [formulation of an] oil policy has been left to a special meeting of the six Gulf countries' ministers of foreign affairs and oil. This special meeting was called for by the recent Abu Dhabi Conference which is expected to convene late next August.

The signing of this agreement raised questions about the future of Iraq in the previous bilateral economic agreements that had been signed between Iraq and the six countries of the Arabian Gulf. Some even raised doubts about whether this agreement would mean that Iraq would become economically isolated from the Gulf.

When AL-MUSTAQBAL raised these questions with the Saudi minister of finance and economics, al-Shaykh Muhammad Aba al-Khayl, he in turn affirmed that this agreement was a framework for organizing and coordinating economic relations between the six countries of the Gulf Council of Cooperation and that the agreement was altogether unrelated to the bilateral agreements between any one of the member countries and other countries. Al-Shaykh Aba al-Khayl told AL-MUSTAQBAL further, "It would not be reasonable at all to isolate Iraq from mutual economic cooperation. Any economic or other agreement to which Iraq is a party will continue to be valid."

Accordingly, if this agreement is confirmed and ratified at the next meeting of the Gulf Council of Cooperation, which is to be held in Riyadh next November, this will mean that all the reservations that some people used to have about the freedom of trade and investment for citizens of the other Gulf countries will be eliminated. Consequently, this will lead the subjects of the six Arabian Gulf countries to travel freely among these countries with their identity cards.

BRIEFS

**BAHRAIN-FRENCH AGREEMENT**--An agreement has been signed at the Public Works, Electricity and Water Ministry between the Bahraini Government and the French (Kojex) Company to build five main power stations with a capacity of 220,000 volts. The agreement was signed on the government's behalf by Majid Jawad al-Jishi, the public works, electricity and water minister. On the company's behalf, it was signed by its general manager, (Drouis Steele). The project will cost 22 million dinars. [Excerpt] [GF271624 Manama Domestic Service in Arabic 1030 GMT 27 Jun 81]

**TELEVISION CENSORSHIP**--The Ministry of Information has decided to retain all imported television films for censorship purposes for not more than 1 week before they are released for circulation. A ministry official said a team of employees will carry out this responsibility. [GF070948 Manama AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 6 Jul 81 p 1]

**CAUSEWAY AGREEMENTS**--The two agreements on the construction of the Saudi-Bahraini causeway will be signed in Manama tomorrow. Finance and National Economy Minister Shaykh Muhammad Abu al-Khayl will sign the first agreement on the implementation of the project on behalf of the kingdom and the contracting company that won the contract. The minister will also sign the second agreement which includes the bases for use of the causeway once it has been built in accordance with the agreement laws. On Bahrain's behalf, the agreement will be signed by Bahraini Development and Industry Minister Yusuf Ahmad al-Shirawi. Shaykh Muhammad Abu-Khayl has stated that this agreement also includes matters related to management and operation. He said this causeway will be an important and positive factor in granting the best transportation means sought by Bahrainis and Saudis. This is the goal of the governments of the two countries under the leadership of his majesty King Khalid ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz and his highness Shaykh 'Issa Ibn Salman al-Khalifah. The minister said that the cabinet approved this agreement which will be signed by the two fraternal countries. [Text] [GF072020 Riyadh Domestic Television Service in Arabic 1930 GMT 7 Jul 81]

**AMIR RECEIVES FRENCH ENVOY**--Manama, 9 Jul (CNA)--Bahraini Amir Shaykh 'Issa Ibn Salman al-Khalifah received here this evening Claude (de Camolaria), special envoy of French President Mitterrand, who is currently visiting Manama. The meeting was attended by Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Hubarak al-Khalifah, Bahraini foreign minister, and Maurice Pierre Fougerousse, French ambassador to Bahrain. In a statement after the meeting, the French envoy said that he conveyed to the amir President Mitterrand's assurances concerning France's stand on current Arab issues, particularly

the Middle East problem. He also said that he conveyed to the amir the French Government's desire to promote relations between the two countries. The French envoy arrived in Manama today within a tour of a number of states in the region. [Text] [JN092216 Gulf News Agency in Arabic 2036 GMT 9 Jul 81]

HEIR MEETS BRITISH DEFENSE SECRETARY--London, 9 Jul (GNA)--His highness Shaykh Hamad Ibn 'Iaa al Khalifah, Bahraini heir apparent and commander in chief of the Bahraini defence forces, met at his place of residence in London today with British Foreign Secretary John Nott. During the meeting a review was made of bilateral relations, especially in the military spheres. The meeting was attended by Shaykh 'Abd ar-Rahman Ibn Farsi, Bahraini ambassador in London. [Text] [JN092110 Manama Gulf News Agency in Arabic 2042 GMT 9 Jul 81]

C501 4304/57

## NILE WATERS STRATEGY DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-MUSAWAR in Arabic No 2958, 19 Jul 81 pp 20, 79

[Interview with Engineer Ahmad 'Abduh al-Sharabasi by Michel Jirjisi: "A Strategy for the Nile Waters"]

[Text] Increasing food security does not necessarily involve producing basic food needs locally or even producing the greater portion of those needs. It involves basically increasing the resources that are necessary to furnish those needs either by producing those resources directly or by importing them in return for exporting other products that may have relatively greater merit. This notion of food security also differs from the necessity of providing an adequate strategic reserve of foods. This strategic reserve, with its patent inevitability, merely represents the short-range side of the general framework of the food security question.

AL-MUSAWAR interviewed the Egyptian scientist, Engineer Ahmad 'Abduh al-Sharabasi, agricultural production affairs reporter for the National Council for Production and Economic Affairs. The discussion centered around a strategy for the waters of the Nile and the importance of projects between Egypt and Sudan to provide water for irrigation.

Engineer Ahmad 'Abduh al-Sharabasi says, "The first thing that was written on the subject of the Nile Valley water policy may have been the memorandum that was made public by the Ministry of Public Works in 1920. This memorandum included the projects that the Ministry of Irrigation had studied. It included future water demands and the courses of action that will be necessary to meet those demands. The memorandum also included clarification of the need to increase control of the Nile to accomplish the utilization of Egyptian lands and the utilization of a designated part of Sudan's lands. This is because in most years the inflow of Nile water in the summer does not meet the need of the cultivated land at the present time, and the need is urgent for expanding the scope of agriculture to new areas that are still fallow because of the lack of irrigation water. The second reason is due to the rapid increase in the number of the population which has almost doubled during the last 40 years, whereas the increase in the area of cultivated land has not been sufficient."

[Question] How has surplus water in the Nile basin been utilized, and how has technical cooperation between Egypt and Sudan fared?

[Answer] The report of the Nile Waters Committee in 1925 was the cornerstone for the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement. The report included 16 topics among which was that of putting the Sennar Dam, the al-Jazirah waterway and the irrigation pumps in Sudan into operation so as not to have the quantities of water taken from the river in Sudan affect irrigation needs in Egypt. To implement this agreement Egypt elevated the Aswan Dam a second time, and this was accomplished in 1933. Then the Jabal al-Awliya' Dam was built and completed in 1937. By agreement with Egypt Sudan was also able to elevate the storage level in the Sennar Dam and to increase gradually the area of cultivated land in al-Jazirah until that area amounted to about 1 million feddans.

The 1929 agreement remained in effect until studies for building the High Dam began in 1954. The Egyptian government thought that before construction on the dam should begin, it had to reach an agreement with the government of Sudan on Egypt and Sudan making full use of the Nile waters and on the damages that the Egyptian government would pay the government of Sudan to compensate it for inundating the city of Halfa and the Sudanese lands that will be covered by the waters of the High Dam below the reservoir.

Negotiations between the two governments began in 1954 on the bases for dividing the Nile waters between the two countries. Early in January of 1956 Sudan's independence was proclaimed, and negotiations were reopened early in 1959. An agreement was reached between the two governments on the full utilization of the Nile waters; it was about these points:

--The acquired rights of the two parties at the time the agreement was signed: 48 billion cubic meters for Egypt and 4 billion cubic meters for Sudan annually at Aswan.

--River control projects and the distribution of the benefits of these projects to both parties.

--The Republic of Egypt would build the High Dam at Aswan; this would be the first episode in a continuing series of storage projects.

--The Republic of Sudan would build the al-Busayris Dam on the Blue Nile.

--The net gain from the High Dam is to be computed on the basis of the river's average inflow at Aswan: 84 billion cubic meters annually. From this amount 52 billion [cubic meters] would be deducted for the acquired rights of the two countries, and 10 billion [cubic meters] would be lost on a continuing basis from the reservoir. Thus, the net gain from the High Dam would be 22 billion cubic meters annually. The share of the Republic of Sudan would be 14.5 billion [cubic meters], and Egypt's share would be 7.5 billion.

The river's natural average inflow at Aswan and the continuing loss of

water from the reservoir in the High Dam Lake would be reviewed by both parties after adequate periods about which they would agree. [This would take place] after the High Dam becomes fully operational and the Egyptian government pays the government of Sudan the sum of 15 million pounds as comprehensive compensation for the damages that resulted from storing water in the High Dam at a level of 182.

Through an agreement with Egypt the Republic of Sudan is undertaking projects that would increase the inflow of the Nile by preventing water loss from the Nile basin to the swamps of Bahr al-Jabal, Bahr al-Zaraf, Bahr al-Ghazal and its tributaries, the Sobat River and its tributaries and the White Nile basin. The net gain from these projects would be distributed equally between the two republics. Each one of them would also contribute proportionately to the total costs.

A permanent technical authority is also being established with an equal number [of professionals] from both republics. It will specialize in drawing up the principal plans for those projects that aim to increase the inflow of the Nile; in overseeing the research that is necessary for these projects; and in supervising the implementation of projects approved by the two governments. The authority sets down operating procedures for the operations that are set up on the Nile inside the borders of Sudan. It also sets down operating procedures for the operations that are set up outside the borders of Sudan with the agreement of those concerned in the countries in which these projects are established. The authority monitors implementation of the operating procedures in all these operations.

Since it is possible that we may have successive years of low inflow and since storage levels in the High Dam may decline accordingly to a degree that may not satisfy both countries' water requirements in the course of any single year, one of the things the authority will have to do is devise a procedure that both republics would have to follow to confront such a situation.

This authority continues to do its work in an atmosphere of understanding and cooperation between the two fraternal countries.

[Question] How are hydraulic and climatic studies on the Upper Nile carried out? What role does the United Nations play in these studies, and what studies have been completed so far?

[Answer] In a desire to complete the water, that is, the hydraulic studies and the meteorological climatic studies of the lakes area, an agreement was reached in 1967 between the UN development program and the World Meteorological Organization [on the one hand] and the Republic of Egypt, the Republic of Tanzania, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda [on the other] to undertake a hydrometeorological survey of Lakes Victoria, Kyoga and Albert.

The objectives of this project were to compile and analyze the climatic and water data of these three lakes for the first stage of the project for the purpose of studying the water level of the Upper Nile. The

collected data and the periodic studies would help the countries make plans for the development and preservation of their water resources. They would also help in preparing the foundations for cooperation between the governments on storing and controlling the waters of the Nile as well as devising programs for this stage.

The objective of this stage is the establishment of additional water and climate observation stations so as to create a complete network [of these stations] covering the areas of the tributaries of the aforementioned lakes. By means of these stations the water and climatic data that are necessary for the studies can be collected, and seven small tributaries can be designated for conducting intense studies on relations between rainfall and the rise [of the water level in the] river. The results of this phase of research would be applied to other parts of the tributaries. An aerial and a land survey would be carried out of the unstable areas on the shores of the lakes which are more subject to change due to variations in the water levels of the lakes. A hydrographic survey of Kyoga Lake would also be carried out, and ways to analyze the existing data as well as the data that will be taken from the new observation stations would be arrived at and proposed. Such analysis would make it possible to chart maps that would indicate the monthly and annual rates of evaporation, seepage, rainfall, stream overflow and such other hydraulic phenomena. Some employees of the governments who are participating in the project will also be trained in hydrometeorological studies. An agreement has been reached that the city of Entebbe in Uganda will be the principal headquarters for the project.

Work on the project began in 1967. In 5 years the project built 50 hydraulic stations, 20 meteorological stations and 12 stations to record the water levels of the lakes. Besides, it improved and upgraded the standard of a small number of existing hydraulic and climatic stations. Seven small tributaries have been selected, and these have been equipped and prepared for intense studies. A topographic survey of the unstable areas of the shores of Lake Victoria has been completed, and the hydrographic survey of Kyoga Lake has been completed. Ethiopia joined the project as an observer late in 1971; Burundi and Rwanda joined the project late in 1972; and regional offices for the project were set up there.

But in August of 1972 the problem of utilizing the large amounts of data that had been collected to arrive at results that would benefit scientific and applied studies cropped up. The data that have been collected and the data that will continue to be collected must be organized so that they can be easily utilized in devising a plan to develop and preserve the water resources that are available.

It was inevitable that we think about setting up a mathematical model for the Upper Nile tributary so it can be utilized in independent development projects.

[Question] What are the objectives of the second stage of the project for making full use of the water resources?

[Answer] An agreement for the second stage of the project has been signed, and the objectives of that stage have been defined. These are long-range objectives to help the countries that are participating in the project make plans to preserve and develop the water resources in the Upper Nile basin and to prepare a basis for negotiations between these countries on the subjects of storage, regulation and usage of the Nile waters.

Among the immediate objectives is that of making a mathematical model of the Upper Nile area, including all the lakes and rivers in the countries that are located in the Nile Basin. This model would help in the development of the water resources of the Upper Nile; and it would help in the creation of various mutual solutions to regulate the Victoria, Kyoga and Albert lakes separately and as an integrated group so that an ideal solution for making full use of their waters can be achieved. Work will continue on estimating evaporation according to the energy balance method, on evaporation measurements, on studying model tributaries, on compiling, publishing and analyzing available data and on training some employees from the countries that are taking part in the project in data analysis methods and in methods of regulating rivers and lakes.

[Question] What is the role of the Aswan Dam at this stage? How is the actual distribution of the Nile waters effected?

[Answer] In 1979 the total discharge from the Aswan Dam was about 56.1 billion cubic meters. The total amount of Nile water used by Sudan [during that year] was 15.8 billion cubic meters. This means that Egypt used 2.6 billion cubic meters more than its share. Water discharged from Aswan was distributed as follows:

Six and a half billion cubic meters of water were discharged into the sea through the Idfina Barrage and the (al-'Ananiyah) Canal. Of this amount about 4.8 billion cubic meters were discharged to generate electricity and to facilitate navigation on the Nile waterway. The remaining water outflow from Aswan includes surplus water from agricultural needs. This surplus is due to the fact that the dates for planting some crops did not coincide with the determined dates. The discharge from Aswan also includes the stored water from the Idfina Barrage; 4.5 billion cubic meters for drinking water and factories; and 47.6 billion cubic meters for irrigation.

In 1980 the total discharge from the Aswan Dam was 56.7 billion cubic meters. Water discharged into the sea through the Idfina Barrage and the (al-'Ananiyah) Canal amounted to 5.5 billion cubic meters. The total amount of water used to irrigate an area of 5.9 million feddans amounted to 53.5 billion cubic meters--with an average of 9,000 cubic meters [of water] per feddan.

This indicates that we discharge more water from the Aswan Dam than our share of the Nile waters, according to the 1959 Agreement [which stipulated our share to be] 55.5 billion cubic meters. This has been possible because the total amount of water taken by Sudan from the Nile is still

less than its share of 18.5 billion cubic meters, as mentioned in the agreement. However, a few years hence Sudan will need its full share of water, and we will then have to abide by discharging 55.5 billion cubic meters of water from Aswan until the first stage of the Jonglei Canal is completed. The shares of both Egypt and Sudan will then increase by about 2.6 billion cubic meters, and Egypt's share of the waters of the Nile will be 57.8 billion cubic meters, whereas Sudan's share will be 20.8 billion cubic meters.

[Question] How are future water needs being met, and what are the methods [that are being used] to manage the water?

[Answer] The need to reclaim 2.3 million feddans from now until the year 2000--that is a rate of 120,000 feddans annually--has been agreed to. It is essential to make plans to provide water for these new lands and to have the schedule for making this water available coincide with the schedule for preparing the reclaimed land for irrigation. If we consider the average irrigation needs per feddan to be 7,000 cubic meters computed at Aswan--that is for sprinkler irrigation and for basin irrigation along with the well-guided use of water and intense cultivation as well--then total needs for the new lands will amount to 16.1 billion cubic meters annually. In addition, there will be an increase in drinking water and in water [needed] for factories as a result of the increase in population and progress in industry.

The means for managing this amount of water lie in proper guidance in the use of irrigation water in the old land; in increasing the re-use of drainage water for irrigation; in reducing the quantity of water discharged into the sea through Idlina Barrage on the Rosetta Branch and the al-'Ananiyah Canal on the Damietta Branch; in utilizing the sanitary drainage water and the water discharged from factories for irrigation after treating that water; in increasing use of ground water that is suitable for irrigation; and in increasing the inflow of the Nile at Aswan by implementing projects to preserve the waters of the Nile at the wells in the Upper Nile.

The Ministry of Irrigation has set down the strategy that must be followed to improve the use of irrigation water in the old lands. It has divided this strategy into three principal stages: the accurate and precise control of water distribution; and the development and improvement of the efficiency of field irrigation so that it can be begun after 1984 in the light of the experiments that are presently being conducted in the Institutes of the ministry and of other international experiments as well. The third stage involves regulating by law the right to use irrigation water. The objective of this stage is to curb waste and [to serve as] a preliminary stage in the new expansion lands.

[Question] What do you think about the Hashar Swamp project and the Bahr al-Ghazal project?

[Answer] The Hashar Swamp is located to the north and east of the point

where the Sobat River meets the White Nile. It is a large area into which surplus water from the Baro River flows as well as the silt coming from the Highlands located to the east. Several proposals have been studied to make use of the water that collects in these swamps by transporting the water to the White Nile near Malut.

So far the preferred project is that of digging a canal from (Khur Jaka) on the Baro River to Malut on the White Nile. The canal would be 340 kilometers long and would have an outflow of 30 million cubic meters per day. Tributary canals would be dug to carry the silt from the eastern highlands to the aforementioned canal; and embankments for the Baro River would be built between (Khur Jaka) and (Khur Mashar). The quantity of water that would be put to use from the implementation of this project is estimated to be 4.4 billion cubic meters annually; and the costs of the project are estimated to be about 160 million pounds.

Most of the waters of Bahr al-Ghazal are lost in the swamps that are located in its basin even though the average outflow from its tributaries is 12 billion cubic meters annually before [this water] goes into the swamps where almost all of the outflow is lost. The average outflow from Bahr al-Ghazal at the mouth of the river is half a billion cubic meters per year.

The largest tributaries of Bahr al-Ghazal are Jur and Lol. Their total average outflow comes to 5 billion and 4.2 billion cubic meters, respectively. The annual outflow changes considerably. In 1953, for example, the total outflow of both tributaries was 6.6 billion cubic meters, but in the following year the total outflow amounted to 12.9 billion. Several proposals have been made to feed the waters of these two tributaries into the White Nile.

The most suitable of these proposals may have been that of digging a 5 kilometer canal from the Jur River to the Lol River with a daily outflow capacity of 22 million cubic meters. The canal would then proceed from the Lol River to Bahr al-'Arab. It would be 66 kilometers long and wide enough for a daily outflow of 37 million cubic meters. From Bahr al-'Arab the canal would flow a distance of 260 kilometers, with an outflow of 40 million cubic meters, until it meets with the White Nile near the mouth of the Sobat River. It is estimated that the water that will be put to use from this project amounts to about 4.4 billion cubic meters per year and the costs of the project are estimated to be about 210 million pounds.

Because of the nature of the Upper Nile areas regarding climate, the difficulty of communications and the unavailability of labor and in light of the current experience of digging the first stage of the Jonglei Canal, consideration must be given in all Upper Nile projects to the fact that implementation of any one of these projects will last between 5 and 7 years.

In estimating the water needs for the years 1985 to 1990 and for the years

1995 to the year 2000 one notices that there is a reduction in the needs of the lands that are currently cultivated because a policy of proper guidance in the use of irrigation water is being used and modern irrigation systems are being gradually applied every year in an area of 100,000 feddans of old land. One also notices that the [water] needs of the reclaimed lands have been estimated at a rate of 7,000 cubic meters of water per feddan on the basis of reclaiming 120,000 feddans per year.

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CSO: 4504/16

**CONSEQUENCES OF IRP HQ EXPLOSION DISCUSSED****Rival Groups, Savame, Savak Accused**

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 1 Jul 81 pp 1-3

[Text] By our diplomatic correspondent in Paris.

Although the blast at the IRP headquarters in Tehran, an event which Ayatollah Khomeini said was something which could be "expected", decimated the party's leadership it could ultimately serve to strengthen the regime and extend the grip of the fundamentalists in Iran.

By Wednesday, contrary to the forecasts of most Iran watchers, the regime had not resorted to mass executions of those alleged to be the authors of the explosion. Not only Khomeini but the man many see as his heir-apparent, Ayatollah Mohammad Montazeri, whose own son, the pro-Libyan IRP and Majles member Hojjat Ol-eslam "Ringo" Montazeri, was killed in Sunday's blast, premier Raja'i and Majles Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani all appealed for calm and called on the public not to take justice in its own hands.

On Tehran radio Behzad Nabavi, the government spokesman now mooted as the future premier, dismissed claims by an Ankara-based organisation calling itself the Party of National Equality, that it was responsible for the blast. It claimed to represent ethnic Turks in Iran. Nabavi hinted that the blast was more probably the work of internal organisations like the Mojahedin-e Khalq or Feda'iyan minority. Only an organisation like the Mojahedin had the sophistication to have carried out such a bombing, he said. He promised documents on the incident would be released shortly.

Khomeini himself also indirectly charged the Mojahedin with having carried out the bombing.

Though the majority of exiles rejoiced over the deaths of so many of those whom they blame for their personal distress and hardships many people back in Iran were shocked by the carnage. This in spite of the butchering of even groups of young people in recent weeks at the notorious Evin prison near Tehran.

It was difficult, however, not to blame the IRP for starting the cycle of violence. Not only their own brutality but their restriction of personal freedoms, and silencing of the loyal opposition groups left no alternative to resorting to violence in the opinion of many of the liberals and leftists. As IPS reported earlier a Mojahedin spokesman in Paris told us, "The IRP has left us no alternative...we are facing a take it or leave it situation".

For the time being the worst effects of the disaster on the IRP will be psychological, observers felt, for except for Beheshti himself most of those who died were hardly brilliant enough to be irreplaceable. Beheshti was the party's real brain, with great political and organisational abilities allied to ruthlessness. The indecision of the authorities in the first couple of days after the explosion reflected his absence from the helm. No organisation was immediately accused.

But plastering over the wounds did begin fairly quickly. Khomeyni ordered Raja'i to reshuffle the government--"Explosive reshuffle" the Paris daily Liberation headlined its story--and Education Minister Javad Bahonar, a hardline close friend of Beheshti, was appointed to succeed him as general secretary of the party. Ayatollah Mousavi-Ardabili, the revolutionary prosecutor general, was appointed as chief justice, another post Beheshti held. The presidential election, in which Raja'i is expected to be chosen, goes ahead on July 24, and elections to replace the dead MPs will also be quickly arranged, it was announced.

Among theories aired on who was responsible for the killing was one that a pro-Soviet wing of the IRP itself which was opposed to Beheshti's rightist policies could have carried it out. Some left wing sources have accused him of paving the way for a resumption of relations with the United States. According to one source Beheshti had already sent a delegation to the U.S. to discuss ways and means and has assured the U.S. that the Tudeh and leftist groups would be dealt with by the IRP.

Yet another theory was that the bombing was a revenge move for the assassination of Mostafa Chamran, the regime's chief of its irregular forces at the front with Iraq. The government announced his death in action, but there have been widespread allegations that he was murdered. Purveyors of this theory point out that the first murder bid following Chamran's death was on his main rival at the national defence council, Ayatollah Khamene'i, who is now in hospital recovering from it.

"There were hysterical scenes at Tehran airport when Chamran's body was flown in but nothing was reported in the government controlled media", a source told IPS. "His supporters were a mystical, highly motivated group and he was a charismatic figure for them."

It was also pointed out that Chamran's brother has a key position controlling Khomeyni's Savama, which has replaced the Shah's Savak, and that it would have the expertise to carry out the bombing. "If this is so then there is a great crack in the security of this regime, just as happened in Savak after the appointment of Moghadam, who was close to the mullahs, and when turncoats like Fardust and former Tudeh men broke into different factions in the last few months of the Shah's reign," the source said.

Yet other observers suggested that former Savak agents themselves could have carried out the exploit.

Nabavi has already expressed publicly his opinion that Bani-Sadr himself was not involved in the bombing incident. But this would not deter many people from associating him with it and it could make any comeback for him that much more arduous.

Some observers were surprised by an attack on rival religious leader Ayatollah Shari'atmadari by Khomeyni this week in which he said it was not enough for him to remain silent now while during the Shah's days he had been "presenting him with wedding rings and congratulations". Portraits of Shari'atmadari were carried by some of the Mojahedin supporters who took to the streets after Bani-Sadr's dismissal.

Sources in Qom say surveillance of Shari'atmadari's home there, where he has been under virtual house arrest for a long period, has been tightened in the last few days. The Azari Shi'ites in the West, whose spiritual leader Shari'atmadari is, no longer give their support to Khomeyni and observers say that if Khomeyni tried to formally arrest his rival it could be "very risky" for him.

A Mojahedin spokesman told IPS that two alternatives seemed open to the regime in Tehran. It could make an all-out attack on what was left of liberal groups and on the leftists like the Mojahedin, which could spark off civil war; or it could bring back Bani-Sadr, believed still in Iran, to liberalise in some ways and put a more human face on things until everyone had recovered from the shock.

"Whichever way they choose the wheel of terrorism and repression, and more terrorism and repression, is in motion, and nothing but another explosion can stop it", he said.

#### Beginning of End for Mullahs, Experts Say

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 1 Jul 81 pp 3-5

[Text] The mullahs' regime is at last beginning to disintegrate, say a group of Iranian observers in London commenting on events of the past week in their homeland.

"It has held up only because of the naivete of the Iranian public, which has been unable to see its flimminess because of the diversions created by Bani-Sadr and the moderates", a spokesman for them said. "The tendency to view Iranian political life as if it were similar to that in the West has also obscured the real truth, which is that the mullahs have held their power until now by giving themselves a mystical connotation through Ayatollah Khomeyni. The bomb has blown up that myth as well as the most powerful brain and the mainstay of their regime in Beheshti."

Nothing much physically has changed in Iran as a result of the disaster at the IRP headquarters, the group contends. For, in effect, the regime's power came from

the naivete and fear of the people, who have watched their friends and relatives taken off to slaughter without, in most cases, lifting a finger in retribution. They mirrored the passiveness of the Shah and his courtiers, his generals and the mass of the educated population in the face of a phenomenon which would have produced a fierce counter-reaction from more politically inclined people.

"Even now, just as in the last days of the Shah, you can live in Tehran and believe nothing nasty is happening there if you stay in the right areas and avoid the centres of trouble", one of the group said. "Some people insist with bravado that everything is all right, while others point to the problems of the economy, shortages and the utter stagnation of all cultural and social life as underlining the fact that the country is virtually paralysed.

"The vast amounts of money in circulation during the final years of the Shah have cushioned Iranians over nearly three years of little or no income and the majority have been living under the illusion that there is something real and intelligible in the system under which they have been living since Khomeyni came to Iran."

People in the country had become so inured to murders and executions during that period, they had failed to react positively, the group spokesman pointed out. But Sunday's blast was changing that. People were shocked by it and have begun to realise, if the reactions the press have been getting are correct, just what bloody times they are living in. The change now was a psychological one.

"The failure to take revenge on the killers has astonished the world", he continued. "But it seems to have been the fact that the people inside the country as well as those outside were so mesmerised by the cataclysmic change in their existence they just sat through disaster after disaster. But Iran is a country of young people and when the slaughter of youngsters began recently it produced a reaction that the mullahs, whose previous bloodthirstiness had in general taken in older elements, could not have foreseen.

"Who placed the bomb at the IRP headquarters is, surely, just an academic question. There are so many sections of the population that are against the mullahs and who, hopefully, will now weld together even if loosely to erode their illusory power, it shouldn't take long to sort them out."

Just as in the last months of the Shah's regime, when the officials and public in Iran were influenced by western comments on their situation, so many Iranians both inside and outside the country in the past two years have been guided by the western commentators' ideas of what the people of Iran were supposed to be thinking. Yet none of those commentators had any idea of the capricious thinking of Iranians on matters affecting their personal interests and their lives. Had the Shah and his officials themselves not been misled into thinking they had the world against them, then the whole tragedy may never have hit Iran.

"Ironically, since the mullahs began to hit the leftists much of the western media has started to turn against them and question their authority and their morals. That same media may yet influence the situation once more and help Iranians to see their errors this time instead of leading them into more."

The unimpressive turn out for the funeral of Beheshti and the others killed in the bomb blast on Tuesday was seen as evidence that the mass public is no longer caught up in the mystical hysteria engendered by Khomeyni's return to Iran's political scene three years ago.

"This must not be underrated, for even sophisticated and supposedly well educated and westernised Iranians proved naive enough back in 1978 to attach themselves to this anachronistic illusion of a messenger from God", the spokesman said.

"Iranians in fact seem to have less political acumen in general than even the desert bedouin is born with. It has taken this virtual holocaust to make even the best educated among them see the horror and absurdity of what they have allowed to happen to them.

"From now on we feel Iranians will be more realistic in looking at their situation and the ruling party will find that not only have they lost their mastermind in Beheshti but they are also up against a new resistance from the public.

"Just so long as the westerners and impressionable exiles are not carried away by the false fear of the Soviet threat and a leftist takeover, and so start a campaign for the rest of the world to start bolstering the Khomeyni regime once more, there is now a great chance that more liberal elements will come to the fore through sheer default on the part of the rulers."

The Mojahedin-e Khalq, the so-called Islamic leftist group, has a strongly leftist leadership but the rank and file is very staunchly nationalistic and anti-Moscow, the commentators point out. Any false move by the pro-Moscow Tudeh party or the marxist Peda'yan could lead to a deadly struggle between them, and leave the left entirely incapacitated and the armed forces a much more powerful element than at present.

"In fact, the differences of opinion between the leftist groups are so great that they could not survive in power for long before they destroyed each other", the spokesman for the group contended. "There are also far more dangerous, nihilistic leftists in the ranks of the extremist mullahs and their cohorts than people realise and the danger of a Soviet takeover in Iran is much greater while the mullahs remain in power.

"Unlike the young Mojaheds, the leftist mullahs have had some close associations with eastern European and Soviet agents and the medieval minds of many of the other fanatical clergy make them unaware of the real aims of Soviet communism and they could be persuaded that the Russians were coming simply to their aid. Now that Beheshti has gone it must be more urgent than ever for the west to try to encourage a more balanced, liberal regime in Iran.

"Certainly the people want that. And it is certainly time, too, that the world takes a new compassionate look at what has happened to the Iranian people in the last three years."

Bakhtiar, Amini Comment on Incident

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 1 Jul 81 p 6

(Text) Both Shapour Bakhtiar and Ali Amini, the two best known opposition political leaders, warned in messages they issued after the massive explosion at the IRP headquarters in Tehran that such acts were to be expected after the repression and violence imposed on the people of Iran by the present regime.

Bakhtiar said it was a sign the people were fed up with their present rulers and wanted to get rid of them. The government in Tehran was making a big mistake in trying to fool the Iranian people, who would do their best to foil the plan of the despotic regime, which he likened to the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia for its brutality against the people.

Amini said the bomb blast was a natural reaction to the repression and assassinations of the regime itself, and predicted further incidents of that kind. In the light of this he called on people in factories, quarters, towns and bazaar areas to form national reconciliation units in which they could join hands to prevent more bloodshed, killing and hatred. Amini has previously announced the setting up a Council of State for the setting up of a national reconciliation government in Iran, saying personalities inside as well as outside the country had agreed to take part in it.

If the present cycle of violence continued, the former premier warned, the country could be turned into a mass cemetery, with all its young elements massacred. Two years of violence and bloodshed under Khomeyni had taken the country back 100 years instead of giving it construction and development.

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EFFECTS OF REACTOR RAID ANALYZED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 226, 20 Jun 81 pp 18-19

[Article by Fu'ad Matari: "From the Ocean to the Gulf: Before and After the Raid"]

[Text] It is naive to say that "Aggression has its rewards" or [to ask] "What did Iraq and the Arabs gain from the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear establishments?"

We are saying it is naive to consider the attack that took place on these establishments to be profitable on the basis of the fact that the bombs which were dropped by the Israeli airplanes did destroy the establishments, and destruction involves no profit. We are, however, talking about profits in the context of what God Almighty says, "But you may hate a thing although it is good for you" (The Cow:216) and in the context of the proverb, "Many harmful things are beneficial," which is derived from the holy verse.

In a few points in which we lay down the aspects of the gain, it becomes evident to us that some of the aspects of the Israeli attack on the [Iraqi] establishments were good for us and that this attack which caused considerable damage was at the same time very advantageous.

First, the Israeli attack confirmed the earnestness of the Iraqi nuclear effort. Had not this effort been serious and had not the information that became available to Israel emphasized--and most of this information was announced in the course of justifying the attack--that the returns on this effort would be forthcoming soon--in fact, very soon--the attack would not have taken place, and it would not have taken place in the manner in which it did.

Second, the raid placed Iraq on the list of confrontation countries. But this did not upset Iraq because Iraq basically conducts itself on the basis of the fact that it is a confrontation country: it does not let its geographical location stand as an obstacle in its way, since it does not have common borders with Israel. There are indicators in every speech delivered by President Saddam or in every economic and military

country. In fact, a few days before the raid President Saddam Husayn was addressing the ministers of foreign affairs of the Islamic countries, who were holding their eleventh session in Baghdad, and he was telling them, "We are all in agreement about the fact that the most important question we are facing at the present time as Islamic nations is that of the task of supporting the Palestinian people."

It may also be said that the raid placed all the Arab countries on the list of confrontation countries. It is inevitable that many people must be wondering: what would prevent the Israeli airplanes, for example, from bombing this or the other Arabian Gulf city?

What would keep Israel from bombing Libya, Algeria, Democratic Yemen and Morocco? What would keep it from bombing Sudan, Mauritania, Tunisia and North Yemen? What would keep it from bombing Somalia and Djibouti if it finds out one day that an effort was being made there and that that effort could in time develop and turn against it?

In fact, what is keeping Israel from bombing Egypt itself when the peace treaty which President al-Sadat concluded created nothing to prevent this from happening if the Egyptian regime were to decide to embark upon a more advanced point in the field of nuclear energy? Israel would bomb Egypt, and it would do so intensely. Who would deter it? We would [then] hear Begin or whoever will be an extension of him or follow in his footsteps articulate the excuses that the attacker would devise. Among these would be one about the fact that the regime in Egypt may change suddenly and another regime may come which does not recognize the peace which President al-Sadat considers a national accomplishment. Should we then expose the safety of our country and our security to the Egyptian threat?

We may not be exaggerating were we to assume that the Israeli raid on the Iraqi nuclear establishments made some key people of the regime in Egypt contemplate what did happen with great bitterness. We may also not be exaggerating were we to assume that President al-Sadat himself did tell himself words that were not consistent with his previous convictions before asking his organizations to change the method of dealing with Israel.

There are many reasons why Egypt is extremely irritated with the raid. Among these reasons is the fact that the raid occurred after the Sharm al-Shaykh meeting between President al-Sadat and the prime minister of Israel, Menahem Begin. The matter appeared as though Begin had informed President al-Sadat of the raid and that President al-Sadat had agreed with him about it or that at least he had not suspended the meeting because the statements that were made after the Sharm al-Shaykh meeting indicated that the two sides were in agreement.

Because of the [state of] irritation we heard Egyptian statements about Israel that we had not heard since the Egyptian-Israeli peace. We heard President al-Sadat saying that the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear

establishments was "a return to the situation that existed before the peace process." We heard the minister of foreign affairs, Kamal Hasan 'Ali saying in front of the People's Assembly--the parliament--which was angry over what happened and apprehensive about what could happen, "Israel has to bear the responsibility for the serious escalation that has come upon the situation in the Middle East as a result of the unjustifiable attack"--as though there were a justifiable Israeli attack--"and the shameful and irresponsible action it took against the Iraqi nuclear reactor." We heard the minister say also, "Israel's allegations that the Iraqi nuclear reactor constituted a threat to its security are no more than foolish and unacceptable allegations and justifications, especially since Iraq did place its nuclear activities under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Commission." [The minister said], "Egypt cannot assume a passive position in view of this serious development."

To the same effect we read that the Egyptian People's Assembly voted on a resolution calling upon President Ronald Reagan and the U.S. administration to take "effective measures" against Israel and to reconsider supplying it with arms. (We read that) the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the Israeli ambassador and delivered to him a protest memorandum.

Third, the Israeli raid constituted a critical test of President Reagan's ability to confront Israel as aggressor and not Israel as the victim of aggression. The Arabs are putting much stock on this matter. Before the raid the judgments that were made on President Reagan's administration were based on supposition, but after the raid these judgments would be based on concrete fact.

The U.S. position on the raid was less than what the Arabs had hoped for. Most of the Arabs want President Reagan to introduce some change into this position so as to make Arab-American relations good. One is to take into consideration the fact that the raid serves President Reagan's administration if this administration has no desire to pursue a just role in the Middle East crisis. But since President Reagan's administration aspires to such a role, the raid does cast many shadows on the true intentions of this administration.

To that effect the raid was the first instance of an attack by a country that is not signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty--that is, Israel--on a country that is signatory to the treaty--that is, Iraq. This attack created a state of dismay in all the countries that are signatory to the treaty, whether they be important or not.

The raid also brought Israeli inflicted wounds to some parts of the international body. Inasmuch as these wounds caused unbearable pain to those who were hit, they did benefit the Arab cause in general. When Menahem Begin says, "France and Italy should be ashamed because of their nuclear help to Iraq," such statements make France and Italy angry, but they benefit the Arab cause. When the situation is such that Israel's UN representative says that UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim "exceeded his

authority in the random remarks he made on the raid," such words would anger this neutral person, but they would raise questions whose mere articulation serves the interests of the Arab cause.

Fourth, the raid occurred at a time when two prominent Arab leaders were paying official visits to countries that influence international policy. The [first of the] two leaders we are referring to is the Saudi monarch, King Khalid ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz who was on a private visit in Switzerland from where he proceeded to a three-day official visit to London and then to an official visit to Paris. The brevity of the Paris visit was forced by the developments that stemmed from the raid. The second leader is President Chadli Bendjedid who was on his first official visit to the Soviet Union.

It is true that British reaction to the raid was characterized by horror and disapproval. Then, King Khalid's arrival after that made the British reaction crystallize into a position that may be very beneficial in the near future.

What is being said about the British reaction is also being said about the French reaction, and then some. It is known that the Israeli raid was not only an attack on Iraqi sovereignty and ambitions; it was also an attack on French technology and French technicians. Accordingly, French reaction had to be strong.

Regarding President Chadli Bendjedid, the observation he made to his aides about the fact that the joint Algerian-Soviet communique included a section on the raid was noteworthy. This section is: "...and the two parties criticize the Zionist attack on Iraq which represents one of the aspects of the Zionist aggressive policy." The importance of this is that President Chadli set a precedent for joint statements which could be issued in the future between the Arab countries and their allies.

It is possible to assume that President Chadli informed the Soviet leaders about some of the telephone conversation that took place between him when he was in Moscow and President Saddam Husayn in Baghdad. That telephone conversation took place immediately after the raid.

We would have hoped that an Arab leader would have also coincidentally been visiting the United States when the Israeli raid on the Iraqi nuclear establishments occurred and that that leader would have adopted the same style that King Khalid adopted in Britain and in France and that President Chadli Bendjedid adopted in Moscow. In fact, we had hoped that King Hasan II or President Ja'far Numayri would have headed to Washington immediately after the attack to tell President Reagan what was raging in the hearts of Arabs.

Fifth, this may be the first time in the history of the Arab-Israeli struggle when the international position in general is with the Arabs, even though it is known that the Arabs have always been the victims of aggression.

The reactions that were expressed in most of the capitals of the world in the 3 days that followed the raid indicated that world public opinion may have understood Israel's excuse in bombing the Iraqi nuclear establishments, had not Israel [itself] preceded the Arab countries in acquiring a nuclear capability. But since Israel which has a nuclear capability--in fact, it does have a nuclear weapon--did launch a raid on Iraq, whose interest in the nuclear question is recent, international public opinion found this difficult to accept. This is a new situation for Israel which has grown accustomed to an international public opinion that becomes delighted when it carries out any attack against the Arab countries. What is important for us Arabs is to utilize this phenomenon well. This phenomenon has confirmed that international public opinion is shaped by convictions and not only by emotions.

These points constitute the model which affirms that the Israeli raid produced some circumspection, revealed some truths and aroused some emotions that had been almost dormant.

It may be said that circumspection was not enough; that the facts were not revealed as they should have been; and that positions did not change in proportion to the magnitude of the Israeli challenge.

This is true to a certain extent, but the reply to this [remonstration] is this:

We had almost given up hope that conditions between Syria and Iraq could improve. But then we found that the Syrian minister of state for foreign affairs was in Baghdad taking part with his colleagues, the ministers of foreign affairs, in deciding what solidarity measures with Iraq had to be taken. We had almost given up hope that conditions between Libya and Iraq would improve, but we suddenly saw that Libya was taking part in the Baghdad Conference and that a candid meeting did take place--this is the meeting that took place between Mr Tariq 'Aziz and Mr 'Abd-al-'Ati al-'Abidi. This meeting must have gone way beyond rebukes since Col Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi announced 4 days after that meeting that he was prepared to clear the air with Iraq, with Saudi Arabia and with Morocco. He charged Yasir 'Arafat, the leader of the Palestinian Revolution, to make the preparations for the Libyan president's visits to Riyadh, Baghdad and Rabat.

Before the raid we had given up hope that anything would make President al-Sadat reconsider his choices; but after the raid and because of it we began hearing Egyptian talk that is inspiring us with some hope that Egypt may return [to the Arab rank].

Before the raid we had given up hope because the age of solidarity between the Arabs had gone and ended, [and we feared that] from this day forward there would be no solidarity but rather further contention. But the raid made Arab leaders sense the gravity of the Israeli threat which may knock on each one of their doors. We hope that this sense will be accompanied by a desire for solidarity and cooperation.

The question that remains is this: Was a disaster inevitable in order for people to become circumspect? Did the disaster have to be of the magnitude of that which befell the Iraqi nuclear establishments with its material and psychological dimensions?

It seems that this was inevitable. What is important now is that we benefit from this extremely harsh lesson.

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**JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED WITH YUGOSLAVIA**

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 31 May 81 p 6

(Text of Joint Iraqi-Yugoslav Communique)

[Text] Joint Communique by the Republic of Iraq and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia:

i. In response to an invitation from Veselin Djuranovic, the president of the Federal Executive Council of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Taha Yasin Ramadan, the member of the Revolution Command Council and the first deputy prime minister of the Republic of Iraq, paid an official and friendly visit to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 27 to 29 May 1981.

At the outset of his visit, Taha Ramadan Yasin, the Revolution Command Council member and the first deputy prime minister, placed a wreath on the tomb of President Tito in the Josip Broz Tito Memorial Center.

Taha Yasin Ramadan also visited Sergei Kraigher, vice president of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and held friendly talks with him during which he conveyed a verbal message from President Saddam Hussein.

He also held talks with Stane Dolanc, member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

In the talks which took place in an atmosphere dominated by a spirit of frankness, friendship and common understanding between Taha Yasin Ramadan, member of the Revolution Command Council and the first deputy prime minister, and his delegation and Veselin Djuranovic, the president of the Federal Executive Council, there was a detailed exchange of views to develop the bilateral relations and the joint cooperation between the Republic of Iraq and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as well as an exchange of views on the situation in international relations.

Taking part in the talks on the Iraqi side were: Hasan 'Ali, member of the Revolution Command Council and the minister of trade; 'Amir Mahdi al-Khashali, the minister of agriculture; Dr Najih al-Rawi, the chairman of the Scientific and Technical Research Council; Ahmad Husayn al-Samarra'i, the undersecretary of the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs; Shakir Mahmud al-Juburi, the undersecretary of the Ministry of Housing and Public Works; Faruq 'Abd al-Samarra'i, the ambassador of the Republic of Iraq; Majid Adham, the general secretary of the Political Relations Bureau of the Council of Ministers; Lt Gen 'Abd-al-Jawad Amin; 'Abd-al-Mahdi al-Sha'lan, the adviser at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Kamal 'Abd-al-Majid, the director of the special office of the first deputy prime minister.

Taking part in the talks on the Yugoslav side were: Zvone Dragan, the vice president of the Federal Executive Council; Milovan Zidar, member of the Federal Executive Council and president of the Federal Committee for Agriculture; Lt Gen Janko (Cuciniar); Dragomir Petrovic, an assistant federal secretary for foreign affairs, Zivko Mucalov, the ambassador of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Republic of Iraq; Ranko Radulovic, an assistant federal secretary for foreign trade; (Nicola) Cecanovic, the president's adviser for foreign affairs and Branislav Novakovic, director of the Near East and North Africa Office of the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs.

2. In addition to these talks, a special meeting was held by the Joint Iraqi-Yugoslav Economic and Technical Cooperation Committee. The Iraqi side was headed by Hasan 'Ali, member of the Revolution Command Council and the minister of trade, and the Yugoslav side by Zvone Dragan, the vice president of the Federal Executive Council. The general minutes of the committee's meeting, including the proposals made to develop and enhance the economic relations between the two countries, were signed.

After studying the bilateral relations between the two countries, the two sides found with utter satisfaction that their cooperation is developing in all spheres. The two sides also stressed their desire to expand this cooperation.

The two sides also notices with utter satisfaction that the results reached in the sphere of trade exchange and of joint investments indicate that there is a real possibility for economic rapprochement and bond in this field and in other spheres. To achieve economic rapprochement between the two countries, the two sides stressed the need to implement the resolutions of the special and ordinary meetings of the Joint Iraqi-Yugoslav Economic and Technical Cooperation Committee so as to solve some of the issues pending and to develop economic and technical cooperation and cooperation in all spheres in the interest of both sides.

3. Upon studying the international relations, the two sides expressed their deep anxiety over the constant intensification of these relations as a result of the activities of the imperialist forces and of their attempts to impose various forms of control and domination, over the crisis of the international detente policy, over the increased desire and tendency toward pressures and toward military intervention, over the endeavors to give legitimacy to the use of force in international relations, over the arms race and over the continued competition of the alliances to expand their spheres of influence, especially in the areas of the nonaligned states and of the developing countries. Moreover, the centers of tension are expanding to new areas and all this poses a serious threat to the security and peace of the world peoples.

4. The situation in the Arab area was discussed with special attention. The Iraqi side explained the tense situation in the Arab Gulf area, the conflict between Iraq and Iran and the circumstances engulfing the eruption of the war between them.

The Yugoslav side expressed its concern over the continued armed conflict between the two neighboring states and its desire to settle the conflict as soon as possible through peaceful means and on the basis of the UN Charter and of the principles of the Nonaligned Movement.

The two sides expressed their support for the initiatives and efforts of the non-aligned countries, of the Islamic States Organization and of the United Nations to establish a ceasefire and to find a just peaceful solution guaranteeing the legitimate rights of the two countries.

The two sides also condemned very strongly the Zionist onslaught against Lebanon and the Palestinian people and stressed that this aggressive conduct on the part of the entity is the result of the reluctance to find a lasting and comprehensive solution for the Middle East problem.

The two sides also believe that it is the essential duty of the international community to take measures to stop the intensification of the situation, to guarantee the rights and independence of Lebanon and the unity of its territories and to find a just and lasting solution for the Middle East problem acknowledging the legitimate rights of the Arab Palestinian people to determine their future, to return to their homeland and to set up their state on their soil.

It was also asserted that the positions taken by the nonaligned countries in Havana and New Delhi vis-a-vis the subsidiary solutions and the Camp David agreement have weakened the unity of the Arab countries and their struggle against the Zionist enemy [sic].

The two sides further reaffirmed that Arab solidarity in light of the principles of the 1978 Baghdad summit resolutions is one of the important and effective factors in confronting the Zionist onslaught and that this solidarity represents the minimum for attaining a just solution for the problem.

The two sides also stressed that they embrace and support the resolutions of the Arab League Council which convened in Tunis recently.

5. The two sides expressed their interest in the dangers emanating from the presence of centers of tension in other parts of the world, such as the ones in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean Sea area.

6. Upon studying the international economic situation, the two sides stressed that clinging to the present economic system leads to entrenching the crisis of the international economic relations which seriously affects the developing countries, particularly the underdeveloped countries, and which constitutes a permanent source of instability and of danger to world peace. Therefore, it has become necessary to begin efforts to reach an agreement and to establish new international economic relations.

7. The two sides believe that the growing resistance against the negative tendencies in the international relations is encouraging, despite the deterioration in these relations.

The two sides expressed their conviction that the conference of the ministers of foreign affairs of the nonaligned countries which convened in New Delhi has proved and stressed that the nonalignment policy, as an independent element free of alliances, represents an effective and strong weapon in the struggle for world peace and security, for peaceful coexistence and equality among all peoples, for comprehensive international detente and new economic relations and against foreign pressures, intervention and all forms of control and domination. The two sides also stressed the need to strengthen the unified and consolidated effort of the nonaligned countries which is embodied in these countries' constant compliance with the movement's fundamental principles, by peaceful solutions to problems and by the principle of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other countries.

8. The two sides expressed their confidence that this visit and the talks held will lead to a continued strengthening and entrenching of the relations of friendship and cooperation between the Republic of Iraq and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

At the conclusion of his visit, Taha Yasin Ramadan, member of the Revolution Command Council and the first deputy prime minister, extended an invitation to Veselin Djuranovic, the president of the Federal Executive Council, to visit Iraq. The visit has been accepted gladly and its date will be set later.

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CSO: 4304/28

## HEALTH, SOCIAL PROJECTS COMPLETED IN SELF-RULE AREA

Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 4 Jun 81 p 7

[Article: "Message of Self-Rule Area: Health and Social Projects Completed in Area's Governorates; Start of Mechanized Harvesting of Wheat and Barley Crops in al-Sulaymaniyah; Symposiums to Poll Farmers on Joining Agricultural Cooperatives in Irbil"]

[Excerpts] With the escalating victories of our triumphant legions against the racist Persian enemy to restore our legitimate rights to our waters and our territories, the self-rule governorates of the area are witnessing distinctive activity in the various spheres and at all levels. The area's projects have achieved high completion rates with distinguished executive efforts.

### Various Projects

The General Secretariat of the Social Affairs Department of the Kurdistan self-rule area has completed a number of health and social projects in the area at a cost of 2.5 million dinars.

These projects include the construction of a hospital with a capacity of 100 beds, 3 medical clinics, 8 health centers, 22 houses for physicians, 2 drugstores, 3 kindergartens and an institute for the blind.

Dr Muhammad Zayur Sharif, the secretary general of the Social Affairs Department, has asserted that under the canopy of the increasing support given by our wise leadership, the area has witnessed a broad renaissance in the sphere of health and social services--a renaissance stemming from the concept of the revolution and of its leading party which devotes all-round attention to man and to providing him with the opportunities of an honorable life by virtue of the fact that he is the means of the goal.

### Start of Harvest

Mechanized harvesting of al-Sulaymaniyah wheat and barley crops of the current season has started. These harvesting operations will continue until the middle of this month.

An official of the Public Agriculture and Agrarian Reform Authority in al-Sulaymaniyah has said that 112 private sector harvesters have taken part in the harvesting of 350,000 donums out of a total of 586,000 donums cultivated with these crops. The remaining part will be harvested by manual labor and other means due to the rugged terrain of the cultivated areas.

It is to be noted that the governorate has been divided into two zones to be cultivated with wheat and barley. The first zone is one with guaranteed rainfall and includes the districts of Kallar and Chamchamal and the other zone covering the remaining parts of the governorate, excluding the area in Shahr Zawe, located within the section with guaranteed rainfall, where the Public Agricultural Organization operates.

#### **Farmer Symposiums**

The Irbil Governorate Central Committee for polling the farmers on whether or not to join the agricultural cooperatives has conducted three symposiums for members of the general assemblies of the cooperatives in the areas of Qurshaqlu, (Dawkardukan) and Qush Tabbah.

The symposiums, attended by the brother officials and members of the party's farmer bureaus in the said areas, discussed the agricultural situation and the means to enhance it in light of the instructions of leader and President Saddam Hussein.

Participants in all three symposiums have pledged to put all capabilities in the service of the battle and to bolster the agricultural procession.

#### **Dahuk Poultry Project**

Work continues in order to complete the Dahuk poultry project which has a designed capacity of 12 million meat-producing chickens annually.

The project includes 5 enclosures with a total capacity of 216,000 hens, a hatchery with a production capacity of 17.2 million eggs annually and a slaughterhouse with a capacity of 6,000 chickens per hour. Work is also in progress to implement the commercial project for egg-laying hens in the District of Quysanjaq in Irbil Governorate with an estimated production capacity of 2.82 million one-day old chicks, in addition to a hatchery with a production capacity of 8 million eggs annually.

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## TRADE, ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH FRG DISCUSSED

Ba'hdad Al-THAWRAH in Arabic 27 May 81 p 11

[Article: "Minister of Trade Meets With Members of Federation of FRG Chambers of Commerce and Industry and Reviews Iraq's Trade and Industry Policy and Its Development Program"]

[Text] Bonn, 26 May--INA--Hasan 'Ali, member of the Revolution Command Council and the minister of trade, met in Bonn last night with members of the Federation of the FRG Chambers of Commerce and Industry.

The minister reviewed Iraq's foreign trade policy, the indicators of the course of Iraq's economy and the dimensions of its development program.

The minister said that the Iraqi delegation's visit is for the purpose of concluding an economic, scientific and technological cooperation agreement between the two countries so as to put bilateral cooperation within a legal form and on firm grounds that serve the mutual interests compatible with the two countries' economies.

The minister added that the agreement will be implemented by the specialized Iraqi establishments and by their counterpart specialized German establishments and firms.

The agreement also calls for setting up a joint committee comprised of representatives of the two countries to meet periodically with the aim of developing and expanding the bilateral cooperation.

The minister also pointed out that even though Iraq lives under conditions of the aggressive war imposed by the current regime in Iran, sums have been allocated this year for an importation program exceeding by 27 percent the sum allocated last year.

Moreover, the appropriations for this year's economic development program exceed by 30 percent that of last year's appropriations for the program. Thus, the total appropriations for these two programs amount this year to \$45 billion.

The minister added that this figure and the high rate of project implementation achieved are the best proof of the strong position of the economy and of Iraq's financial capability.

Hasan 'Ali also pointed out that the Baghdad International Fair plays an important role in foreign trade, considering that it secures more than 50 percent of the total imports. Measures have been taken to enable the companies taking part in the fair to bring in larger volumes of the highly technological goods they display.

The minister also asserted that the Revolution Command Council in Iraq is determined to forge ahead with implementation of the development programs despite the conditions of the defensive war that we are waging against Iran. Iraq has taken measures necessary to insure the safety of foreign experts and workers against dangers, to create the right atmosphere to energize the work of the [foreign] companies and to provide for their needs, all of this without charge.

Iraq has also declared its readiness to discuss with these companies the implementation of projects, the difficulties faced and how to fulfill their commitments in a spirit of cooperation by finding the necessary solutions to facilitate the fulfillment of these commitments.

Hasan 'Ali also announced that the Iraqi Government gives the companies that have continued their work during the war period preferential treatment acknowledging the spirit of cooperation displayed by these companies under the war conditions.

He added that the war conditions have made Iraq adopt priorities in implementing the development projects and the oil industry projects.

Concluding his address, the minister of trade lauded the Arab-German relations and the increasing attention given to developing them. He then answered the questions and inquiries of the federation members on the various economic and commercial aspects in Iraq.

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## COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES, POLITICAL CLIMATE DISCUSSED

Paris LE MONDE in French 20, 21-22 Jun 81

[Article by Jean-Pierre Peroncel-Hugos]

[20 Jun 81 p 9]

[Text] Karak--Easygoing and standoffish at the same time, this big Bedouin town of 20,000 inhabitants lies 125 kilometers south of Amman. Dwarfed by the giant ruins of its Crusader castle and forgotten on its rocky peak since the 12th century, when Etienette de Chatillon, the defeated "lady of Le Crac," was forced to hand it over to Saladin, the sultan of the Moslems, the small city seemed even recently to have gone to sleep forever.

In this region of steep hills where no foreigner had lived since Lawrence of Arabia<sup>1</sup> or Giubb Pasha, there suddenly appeared the red or green turbans of Sikh technicians. They were followed by Egyptian fellahin wearing pink or sky-blue galabias, who were followed in turn by Pakistani workers in their baggy trousers. Finally, one evening at dusk in front of the mosque, the chattering stopped and all heads turned as one to watch a minibus disgorging a group of young Philippine women wearing tight jeans and made up like actresses from the year 1935.

Karak slept poorly that night, but it had sensed that like it or not, a new era had begun. Could this be the "time of progress and prosperity" that Radio Amman had been promising for years?

The Indian technicians, Egyptian workers, and pretty Asians worked hard. Roads were surfaced, fields were cleared of stones, public facilities were developed or modernized, and small processing industries were established in the valley. Tourists were brought in, and the soft snap of closing doors on official Mercedes became a familiar sound. Karak got statistics. Karak has been overtaken by the new age. For the moment the town is proud of it, but has the lot of its inhabitants really been radically improved as a result of all the commotion and all those achievements?

## Capitalist Success

There is reason to doubt it when one sees teenagers smoking two packs of cigarettes a day to give themselves the swaggering look seen in advertising from across the Atlantic, when one notices that the province's nomads no longer eat anything except canned food--which they swallow without even heating it--and when one meets Abdallah,

A young Palestinian said this about last sheep and goats and uses a flattened胎牛皮 as a pillow.

Although late in coming and attenuated, the phenomena noted in Karak do make that unpretentious district administrative center a microcosm of "rejectionist Jordan," which is what Cairo's ruler has called the Hashemite kingdom since King Husayn refused to participate in the Camp David peace process on the grounds--repeated just recently--of a theoretical "Jordanian option" that would consist of returning to Amman, at least provisionally, the Israeli-occupied West Bank.

Rejectionist Jordan is also a country that has become an example of capitalist success in less than a decade--having "rid itself" of its armed Palestinian elements following the murderous confrontation of 1970 (they are now in Lebanon) and kept its citizens of Palestinian origin, who represent approximately 60 percent of its total population and 80 percent of the population of its capital and devote themselves with talent to commerce, industry, and finance. It is an all the more remarkable example in that following the 1967 loss of the West Bank, which had been providing nearly 50 percent of the national income, there was little expectation that a Jordan reduced to the Jordan River's east bank would survive economically. Accustomed to the stereotype of the Beirut Palestinian armed with his submachinegun and dialectics, the observer now discovers that Palestinian's unexpected cousin in Amman--a cousin who smokes big cigars, reads stock market newspapers, and is the mainspring of the country's economic achievements.

Practically speaking, everything functions well in Jordan. Business, first of all, Amman hums with commercial and financial activity and, including its outskirts, has a population of 1 million (the kingdom's total population, excluding the West Bank, which has been occupied by the Israelis since 1967, is 2.2 million). In 1946 Amman was an impoverished market town with 46,000 residents, but in 1981 it is a big city bursting with health. As a new Petra--that small Nabataean Arab city in the southern part of today's Jordan which succeeded in controlling a major share of Eastern trade at the end of ancient times--Amman has been able, as a result of the weakening of Beirut and the incapacity of Egypt, to become the new hub of the Middle East. The service sector provided 63 percent of the gross domestic income in 1980.

In 1.5 years Amman opened five new big hotels that immediately hummed with businessmen from every corner of the world, including South Korea and Singapore. It built a 67-kilometer peripheral boulevard that is already being overrun by frenetic real estate development. It is building a second international airport that will perpetuate the memory of Queen Alia, killed in a helicopter accident in 1977.

The Hashemite monarchy has been held up to obloquy by the Baathist regime in indigent Syria<sup>4</sup> since last year, but on the other hand, it has been coddled during the same period by the Baathist regime in rich Iraq, not to mention the benefits that have long been lavished on it by the oil dynasties on the Arabian Peninsula. In 1980, the "pension" paid to Amman in three nearly equal parts by Baghdad, Riyadh, and the oil principalities totaled the equivalent of 6 billion francs. That sum, added to Western--especially American--aid totaling 1 billion francs, has been well managed and not too badly distributed, with the result that in 1980 a nation whose exports (chiefly phosphates) cover only 15 percent of its imports was able, as in previous years, to show a comfortable surplus in its balance of payments. The Jordanian dinar is completely convertible and one of the strongest currencies in the Arab world. The

current rate of economic growth is 9 percent, while the inflation rate does not exceed 10 percent.

### One Hundred Thousand Immigrants

Although Jordan has been the only non-petroleum-producing Arab state (along with Lebanon) forced to attract foreign manpower in its hour of prosperity--there were more than 100,000 immigrants from the Third World in 1980--it is also true that back in the time of lean cows, more than 400,000 members of its working population (the great majority of them Jordanians of Palestinian origin) left to go work on the Arabian Peninsula and are still there. For the moment, they prefer to invest in Jordan--especially in construction--rather than return there, and in 1979 they transferred the equivalent of more than 2.5 billion francs to their adopted homeland. So the expatriates make a good showing among the architects of an expansion which, according to UN figures, has meant a doubling in 3 years of Jordan's annual per capita income, which exceeded 5,500 francs in 1979.

Since 1975, in an effort to tone down the imported and artificial nature of its achievements, Jordan has been pursuing a determined policy for the development of its agricultural and industrial resources, which incidentally are very limited. As a result, the share of gross domestic income contributed by those two sectors has grown in 5 years from 15 to 37 percent. Fruit and vegetables from the Jordan River--including, it is true, those from the occupied bank--supply Saudi Arabia. Aqaba, Jordan's window on the Red Sea, is already dedicated to tourism and port traffic (chiefly for Iraq, especially since the war with Iran), and with the help of the French Spie-Batignolles Company, it is now putting up a huge chemical fertilizer complex along its 25 kilometers of coastline. On the Dead Sea, large-scale preparations are underway for the extraction of Lissan potash (at 2 billion tons, the deposits, which were discovered in 1972, make up the world's largest reserve of that product) and of Finan copper farther south.

Even if it is true that "the Jordanian Government, (after) demonstrating great efficiency in management... of an economic system... based on foreign aid,... now seems to be showing the same talent for transforming that system,"<sup>6</sup> the fact remains that the "Jordanian miracle" is still fragile, since it depends to a large extent on the changes in mood (or regime) that may occur in Baghdad or Riyadh and on the spurious peace that prevails in that region.

[21-22 Jun 81 p 2]

[Text] The transformations experienced by the provincial capital of Karak, that overgrown village of 28,000 inhabitants, provide a general picture of a country--capitalist to a large extent and fueled by Arab aid--whose development is so rapid that it is already having to use 100,000 foreign workers (LE MONDE, 20 June).

Amman--It resembles a beautiful piece of countryside in Provence, with the exception that here the tops of the cypresses would be overlooked by a blue and white minaret. If you are a man and you lose your way in the dry hillside oasis making up the University of Jordan (it was established in 1962 and now, 19 years later, has 12,500 students, with another 3,000 enrolled at Yarmouk University, which was established in the northern part of the kingdom in 1976), don't take it into your head to ask your

and on top of the girls' skin path you will close and who, at the very most, allow no more of themselves to be seen than their lowered eyes and pinched lips. She would turn her head, convinced that a good Moslem woman "must speak only to the males of her blood and her husband."

As in Egypt or Lebanon, the fundamentalist phenomenon in Jordan shows up first on the campuses, where the Iranian revolution has given tremendous impetus to the ambitions and dreams of the young Islamic fundamentalists. SAWT AL-ISLAM (Voice of Islam), a clandestine student newspaper, bears witness to a passionate admiration for the Persian ayatollahs while simultaneously attacking the teachers and women students of Amman "whose minds have been corrupted by the West." To avoid turmoil, it became necessary last year to install prayer rooms in the various departments, even though a superb and huge mosque is located at the entrance to the university.

The pious students, who are represented by four or five associations, do not seem impoverished--if one is to believe concordant testimony from various sources, they offer money to girls who agree to adopt "modern Islamic dress," the chief component of which is a sort of cassock in muted colors. And they travel in private automobiles or taxis, preferably those belonging to the Al-Jihad ("holy war") Company.

The similarities with the situation in neighboring countries end there. While Syria or Iraq hunts down the Moslem Brotherhood and Egypt only tolerates it, Jordan is probably the only Arab state--if we except Saudi Arabia, Islam's "Vatican," which lives under a theocratic regime and has never been colonized--that recognizes the brotherhood, which is the traditional champion of militant fundamentalism. The Moslem Brotherhood originated in Egypt, where it was founded half a century ago, but it "knows no frontiers except those of religion." It is regarded by Jordanian authorities as a "welfare association."

#### Supreme Leader

It was during the time of Nasir, when Radio Cairo was promising young King Husayn on a daily basis that he would meet the same bloody end as his cousin Faisal II in Baghdad (1955-1958), that Amman offered asylum to some brotherhood members who had escaped from Egypt's prisons and even its gallows. Even today, it is one of Nasir's former compatriots, Kamil Sharif, a man who if not a member of the brotherhood is at least close to it, who is the kingdom's minister of religious affairs and holy places. And his brother, Mahmud Sharif, publishes one of the two progovernment newspapers in Amman: AL DUSTUR (The Constitution), whose circulation is estimated at 35,000.

The brotherhood's acknowledged supreme leader ("murshid") in Jordan has for years been a lawyer from Salt, a small middle-class town 30 kilometers northeast of the capital. He is Muhammad 'Abd-al-Rahman Khalifah. He was born in 1926 and was first a judge, then a deputy from 1956 to 1961 and a member of the Executive Board of the Interstate Islamic Conference. He has no qualms about presenting himself in the Arab "Who's Who" (1978 edition) as "deputy chairman of the Executive Council of the Moslem Brotherhood for the Arab world." This eminent person sometimes expresses himself as "worldwide spokesman for the Moslem Brotherhood," as happened, for example, when condemning the Egyptian-Israeli peace.

During the rest of the time, and efficient as well, Khalifah has gradually seen to it that school curricula and programs on TV-1 bear the invisible--but omnipresent--

"nihil obstat" of the brotherhood. The government has also granted the brotherhood de facto "responsibility for overseeing the country's moral health." It was about time. A new hydra--not with 1,000 heads but with 1,000 videocassettes (pornographic, of course)--was threatening Jordanian young people after corrupting the youth of the petroleum-producing principalities. It is believed in Amman that information from the brotherhood's "secret service" is what has led to police searches at import firms involved in that culpable business.

In exchange for those concessions, which do not cost much politically, the Moslem Brotherhood does not badger the government, as it does in Egypt, to enforce Koranic punishments, outlaw interest on loans, or remove Christians from responsible posts. The Christians are well represented in most of the government organizations--in some cases overrepresented in terms of their numbers in the total population (13 percent)--and it can be said that currently they are the minority living most peaceably in the Middle East. The excessive Islamization of education does not overly disturb them, since their own schools do not appear to be threatened.

But the assassination on 16 March of two Christian teachers in Ajlun, in the northern part of the kingdom, by alleged members of the Moslem Brotherhood (who were arrested a month later) nevertheless caused a sense of anxiety to pass over the minority community.

Will the fundamentalists always be content with their portion of influence--all in all quite limited--and will they remain one of the "objective" supporters of the Hashemite throne? A young Amman university student says: "It is not certain, because the moderate wing of the brotherhood, which is especially strong in national education, has apparently been outflanked recently by a more radical wing that is predominantly Palestinian in its thinking." Other Jordanian intellectuals compare the radical wing to the former clandestine Islamic liberation movement (Al-Tahrir Al-Islam) established by a Palestinian about 40 years ago in Jerusalem, which was then partly under Jordanian control. That movement attracted part of the intelligentsia on both banks of the Jordan River for a time during the 1950's. Whether related to that movement historically or not, an increasingly numerous faction within the Moslem Brotherhood seems to want to reject cooperation with the Jordanian Government. 'Abdallah 'Azzam, the Palestinian professor of Islamic law who was excluded from the Amman university in 1980, was probably one representative of those leanings.

#### Syrian Hegemony

It is also noted that one of the small student Islamist groups decided in Amman to call itself Takfir wa Hijra--which can be translated as "Anathema and Retreat"--a name already used in Egypt by a secret association of violent and anarchistic Moslem "Carbonari" who in 1977 took hostage and killed a modernist ulama in Cairo who had been a minister under President Sadat. Their leaders were subsequently tried and executed. There was renewed talk of the Takfir during the disturbances at Mecca in 1979. Does a Jordanian branch still exist? Some people think so.

The various fundamentalist sensibilities in Jordan agree on at least one thing, and that is the aid to be given to Moslem Brothers in Syria, who are waging merciless war on the Damascus regime--not so much, incidentally, because it is autocratic but because it is dominated by the Shiite Mosle...rity of the Alawites (or Nocairis), "heretics among heretics" in the eyes of the Sunnites. But that support, facilitated

by a frontier running through the open desert, does not seem to have gone beyond the stage of welcoming fugitives with open arms. And that was already being done in any case before General Assad took power in 1970--as, for example, when Jordan granted asylum to Syria's two most famous fundamentalist jurists, Mohamed Hubarak and Mustafa Zasha, who have been teaching in Amman since then. The brotherhood was outlawed in Syria as far back as 1963.

Although Damascus has used the pretext of "Jordanian support for the terrorist Moslem Brotherhood" to maintain a situation of tension with Jordan since last year--due in reality to Syria's hegemonic designs on the area--it is completely obvious that King Husayn, who refused to join in the Camp David peace process in order to avoid turning his Arab neighbors against him, has not run the risk of provoking the most powerful of those neighbors by transforming his kingdom into a rear base for the Syrian Moslem Brotherhood.

The fact remains that if the Hashemite sovereign wants to prevent the holy brotherhood from someday turning into dangerous opposition in his own country, he will have to let Jordan continue as a refuge for any member who is being hunted. There is limited room for maneuver between those two exigencies, but King Husayn, who at 45 years of age is one of the youngest but also the most senior of the Arab chiefs of state, has already met many other challenges in the 30 years of his reign. So most of his subjects, who could not care less about living under a fundamentalist Koranic regime--requiring only that their monarch be a descendant of Muhammad--"let him to see that the Moslem Brotherhood remains a shadow in their country, and only a shadow."

#### FOOTNOTES

1. British officer and writer (1888-1935) who was one of the architects of the Arab revolt--called a "revolution" by the Arabs--against the Ottomans in 1916-1918.
2. British officer in command of the Arab Legion from 1939 until 1956, when it became the Jordanian Army.
3. In March 1981, only about 100 Palestinians remained imprisoned in Jordan for political reasons, and none was under a death sentence, according to the local section of the International League for Human Rights.
4. In February, a Syrian commando arrested in Sobeileh, near Amman, allegedly had been sent to assassinate Jordanian Prime Minister Madhir Bedran.
5. The total traffic through Aqaba rose from 1.5 million tons in 1974 to more than 5 million tons in 1979.
6. Francois Rivier, "Croissance industrielle dans une economie assistee: le cas jordanien" [Industrial Growth in an Assisted Economy: the Jordanian Case], French Center for Study and Research on the Contemporary Middle East, Beirut, 1981, 227 pp.

11798  
CSO: 4319/6

AMBASSADOR TO UNITED STATES URGES CLOSER ARAB TIES TO USSR

Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 3 Jun 81 p 2

[Interview with Shaykh Sa'ud Nasir al-Sabah, Kuwait's ambassador to the United States, by 'Adnan al-Katib: "Kuwait's Ambassador in Washington Urges Gulf States To Establish Relations of Cooperation With Soviet Union; It Is Habit of United States and West to Cast Doubts on Whatever Unites Arabs"]

(Text) New York--Shaykh Sa'ud Nasir al-sabah, Kuwait's ambassador to the United States, has expressed his deep regret for the abnormal relations binding the Gulf states with the Soviet Union and has urged these states to establish diplomatic relations with Moscow.

In an interview with an AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM correspondent at his office in the Kuwaiti Embassy in Washington, the ambassador said that the establishment of relations of cooperation in all spheres between the Arab Gulf states and the Soviet Union should be among the foremost goals that the Gulf Cooperation Council should try to realize now that the Soviet Union has announced its sincere intentions toward the Gulf states on more than one occasion. Following is the interview in detail:

[Question] Mr Ambassador, how would you describe the escalating threats against Kuwait and what are the measures being taken by the Kuwaiti Government to counter these open challenges?

[Answer] At the present time, the Kuwaiti Government doesn't intend to adopt specific measures to answer these threats because it doesn't attach serious importance to them. Kuwait realizes that Iran is undergoing difficult circumstances as a result of its conflict with Iraq. However we are fully vigilant insofar as a result of its conflict with Iraq. However, we are fully vigilant insofar as safeguarding Kuwait's security against any Iranian intervention is concerned. The Iranian threats are unjustifiable, provocative threats. Kuwait has abided by and continues to abide by neutrality vis-a-vis the Iraqi-Iranian war. However, Kuwait will not abandon its pan-Arab commitments toward the fraternal Iraq and the Iranian threats will not prevent the State of Kuwait from continuing to advance financial aid to the fraternal Iraq. We hope that Iran will regain its senses, will adopt a moderate neutral stance toward the Gulf states and will put an end to its threats.

[Question] What is your evaluation of the outcome of the latest conference of the OPEC ministers of oil which was held in Geneva and are there any aspects that you wish to stress concerning Kuwait's oil policy?

[Answer] Our oil policy is clear and is based on the endeavor to go along with the wish of the majority in the organization, taking into consideration the separate interests of the member states, even though these interests are often in conflict.

Kuwait has not hesitated to go along with the wish of the majority insofar as freezing oil prices is concerned.

#### Gulf's Relations With Moscow

[Question] What effect do the negative relations existing between the majority of the area's states and the Soviet Union have on the area's security and on the Soviet policy in the Gulf area? Don't you think that these negative relations have made the Soviet Union rely totally on the states allied with it officially, such as South Yemen and Ethiopia?

[Answer] Kuwait enjoys very good relations with the Soviet Union and there is strong cooperation between the two countries in all spheres. I regret to say that most of the Arab Gulf states do not realize the importance of establishing good relations with the Soviet Union; relations that are on the same level as those with the United States. Therefore, I hope that the Arab Gulf states will hasten to rectify this situation and to establish cordial relations with the Soviet Union. I also hope that this will be one of the goals that the Gulf Cooperation Council will try to achieve because the Soviet Union is one of the important superpowers and we are very much affected by its presence, especially since the Soviet Union has repeatedly underlined its good intentions toward the area and its wish to cooperate with the Gulf states in all spheres.

#### It Is Habit of West to Cast Doubts

[Question] Some political observers here have their doubts concerning the feasibility and effectiveness of the Gulf Cooperation Council, in whose creation Kuwait has played a pioneer role, on the grounds that it is a mere link in the chain of superficial political blocs. What is your comment on this evaluation?

[Answer] We should pay no attention to the tendentious U.S. campaigns to cast suspicions. The creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council has come in response to a sincere desire by the area's governments and peoples which have found no need to consult the United States on this issue. The United States and Western circles generally have become accustomed to casting doubts on any blocs seeking to unite the Arabs. We are fully confident that this council will lay down the cornerstone for the realization of comprehensive unity among the Arab Gulf states. This is what the Western circles fear.

#### Iraq and Cooperation Council

[Question] Some Arab and Western political observers voice complaints regarding the incomplete structure of the Gulf Cooperation Council, considering that this council was supposed to include the area's other countries, such as Iraq for example.

[Answer] The Gulf Cooperation Council has not sought to isolate Iraq and it looks forward to cooperation with the fraternal Iraq in its capacity as an extremely

important Gulf state. Iraq's absence from the council has been dictated by technical factors resulting from Iraq's preoccupation with a critical phase with Iran. Iraq's accession to the council may cause Iran to view the council as nothing more than a political bloc against it. This is not what is intended by the council and this council will welcome Iraq's accession after Iraq's conflict with Iran is ended.

#### European Movement

[Question] Do you expect any political movement on the part of the European group to settle the Middle East problem in the near future?

[Answer] The Venice declaration constituted a positive start on the part of the European group. However, the Arab world is waiting for the European group to translate the contents of that declaration into practical steps that are put into implementation. It is now the responsibility of the Arab states to adopt a united position to encourage the Western group to carry on with this initiative and to build upon it so that it may crystallize in a manner acceptable to the Arab world. It is also our hope that the United States will adopt a position compatible with that of the Western group. The Western group has made it clear that its initiative requires the support, encouragement and blessing of the United States. Regrettably, the United States has not taken a clear position toward this issue.

#### U.S. Position

[Question] What is your comment on what the political observers here have described as the U.S. evasion regarding an announcement of a clear policy on the Middle East even though several months have passed since President Reagan's administration has come to power?

[Answer] It seems that the domestic problems faced by the U.S. administration have greatly affected the administration's interest in foreign affairs, especially the Middle East issue. However, I find that President Reagan's administration is more understanding [aktharu wa'yan] than the Carter administration. I have a strong hope that this administration will be in the near future in a position that will enable it to declare a clear and balanced Mideastern policy.

8494

CSO: 4304/27

TIGHTER SCHOOL LICENSING REGULATIONS CITED

Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 2 Jun 81 p 2

[Article: "Ministry of Education Stops Issuing Licenses for Establishment of New Institutes and Schools and Bans Arab Students From Enrolling in Foreign Schools"]

[Text] The Ministry of Education has responded to the wish of the National Assembly by stopping the issuance of licenses for the establishment of private institutes or private foreign schools or their branches. At the same time, the ministry has issued several decisions regulating the enrollment of Kuwaiti and Arab students in these schools and outlining the powers and duties of private school owners.

These decisions have been taken by Dr Ya'qub al-Ghunaym, the minister of education, who has instructed the ministry's concerned authorities to stop issuing licenses for opening private institutes, foreign schools or their branches in the country as of the date of the issuance of this decision, provided that the initial approvals given to the citizens to open such institutes and schools be considered valid within the limits of the academic year for which they are licensed and provided that the renewal of these licenses is not permitted.

Student Enrollment

At another level, the ministerial decision has confined the enrollment of Kuwaiti students and the children of the Arab communities in the foreign private schools in Kuwait according to the following regulations:

1. The children of the diplomatic or consular Arab missions accredited to Kuwait and of the agencies attached to them.
2. The children of officials of the Kuwaiti Ministry of Foreign Affairs--diplomatic and consular corps, offices and centers annexed to the Kuwaiti embassies abroad--who have worked in the aforementioned embassies.
3. Students sent to foreign countries on scholarships and academic missions for a period of no less than 1 year.
4. Kuwaiti and Arab students who have already studied in foreign schools outside Kuwait.

5. The children of special Arab groups whose circumstances require that their children be enrolled in these schools.

Those affected by the provisions of the first article of this decision who wish to enroll in foreign schools have to submit to the Ministry of Education applications including the following:

A document issued by the head of the Arab diplomatic mission attesting that the student's guardian is an embassy official with a diplomatic or consular status or an employee of one of the centers annexed to the embassy and not an employee working with the embassy on a local contract.

A notification from the Kuwaiti Ministry of Foreign Affairs attesting that the guardian is a ministry employee whose duties require him to work outside Kuwait.

Third group: A copy of the decision by the authority concerned to dispatch the student on academic scholarship or mission.

Fourth group: The guardian shall submit a letter from the party for which he works explaining the justification for enrollment in these schools. Acceptance of the justifications is up to the ministry. Enrollment in foreign schools in Kuwait shall be confined to foreign students who are not Arab citizens.

The ministry's undersecretary shall lay down the regulations governing the enrollment of the following students in the schools specified in the preceding article:

A. The children of Arab diplomats.

B. Arab students who have studied in foreign schools outside Kuwait.

C. Arab students from groups other than those specified in the two preceding paragraphs.

The decision excludes Armenian students who are Arab citizens only when enrolling in Armenian schools. The Arab students enrolled in foreign schools shall complete the regular 1981-82 academic year. Renewed enrollment shall not be permitted for any reasons, unless in accordance with the rules spelled out by this decision.

Regarding the duties and responsibilities of the owners and principals of private schools, they have been defined by ministerial decision No 5974 as follows:

The duties and responsibilities of a school principal are defined in the following:

1. Implementing all the technical and administrative rules, regulations and decisions issued by the Ministry of Education, especially those pertaining to the density of classes, transportation and school attendance.
2. Supervising all the activities of the school workers, both technically and administratively.

3. Preparing at the end of each academic year an estimated budget on the number of classes, students, educational facilities, the school's needs as to manpower and material, including furniture, instruments, equipment and raw materials, and the maintenance required by the school building.

4. Making certain that the process of collecting scholastic fees, transportation fares, the cost of school uniforms and textbooks, the payment of the worker wages, rights and vacations follows the decisions and regulations in force.

The responsibilities and duties of a school owner are defined in the following, without violating the owner's responsibilities toward the other governmental authorities:

1. Providing the manpower required by the school's actual needs and in accordance with the performance levels set by the ministry, taking into consideration the technical qualities of the teaching and managerial staffs and making up for any deficiency whenever it occurs.

2. Providing the material requirements needed, including furniture, instruments, equipment and raw materials, at the beginning of the academic year and in accordance with the statement presented by the school principal, as well as providing constant maintenance for the school building, its furniture, its facilities and its annexes.

3. Providing good means of transportation to the students wishing to subscribe to the school transportation and abiding by the numbers permitted [per transportation unit] by the authorities concerned.

4. Implementing all of the Ministry of Education's decisions and regulations in accordance with the pledge undertaken by the owner when given the license to open the school.

5. Performing all the procedures for acquire residence and work permits for all the school workers and concluding work contracts with these workers in accordance with the provisions of the law governing work in the private sector.

6. Observing the legal conditions governing the issuance and renewal of school licenses and the expansion of the school's educational stages.

A school owner may nominate a deputy meeting the following conditions:

1. The school owner shall submit a nomination letter in accordance with the form approved by the ministry.

2. The candidate's level of education must be acceptable to the ministry and the ministry must approve his engagement in this work.

3. The guidance and supervision of the Ministry of Education--the Private Education Department--shall apply to the candidate.

4. Implementing all of the Ministry of Education's decisions and regulations in accordance with the pledge undertaken by the owner when given the license to open the school.

5. Performing all the procedures for acquiring residence and work permits for all the school workers and concluding work contracts with these workers in accordance with the provisions of the law governing work in the private sector.
  6. Observing the legal conditions governing the issuance and renewal of school licences and the expansion of the school's educational stages.
- A school owner may nominate a deputy meeting the following conditions:
1. The school owner shall submit a nomination letter in accordance with the form approved by the ministry.
  2. The candidate's level of education must be acceptable to the ministry and the ministry must approve his engagement in this work.
  3. The guidance and supervision of the Ministry of Education--the Private Education Department--shall apply to the candidate.
  4. He shall notify the Ministry of Education when he is compelled to be absent from the school for more than 1 week during the academic year.
  5. The responsibilities of the school owner's deputy shall be confined within the limits of provisions one, two, three and four of the third article of this decision.

The school owner and school principal must coordinate on the following:

1. Preparation of the budgets concerning the classes, students, manpower and material requirements needed for the good progress of work at the school before these budgets are approved by the Ministry of Education.
2. The two shall cooperate in implementing the concerns of the administrative aspects which guarantee the soundness of the educational process, without violating the first provision of the second article of this decision.
3. Determine a certain sum of money advanced as a temporary loan and put at the disposal of the principal (petty cash fund) to meet any emergency expenses. When consumed, this sum shall be replenished periodically in accordance with the acknowledged accounting principles.

The ministry has abolished decree No 75339, issued on 2 June 1977, concerning the determination of the duties of candidate principals and their relationship with the ministry's agencies and with the school owner.

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CSO: 4304/27

## RISE IN FIRST FOUR-MONTH EXPORTS REPORTED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 22, 1 Jun 81 p 2

(Text)

The Beirut Chamber of Commerce and Industry last week released what appeared to be surprising figures for Lebanese exports during the first four months of this year. According to its statistics, exports certified by the Chamber in the months of January to April inclusive totalled LL 814 million (\$189 million) compared to LL 671 million (\$155.6 million at today's rates) for the corresponding period of 1980. This represents a 23 per cent increase.

The exported goods accounted for by the four Chambers of Commerce of Lebanon are generally considered to represent only 70 per cent of the country's total. The reason for this is that - apart from illicit exports which are impossible to estimate with any degree of accuracy - a wide category of goods does not have to be registered with the Chambers because it is exempt from the certification of origin requirement.

According to the Beirut Chamber, Lebanon's total exports in the first four months of this year registered a

men 7.5 per cent increase over the comparative period of last year. That ratio is far below the country's rate of inflation and much less than the decline in the real value of the Lebanese Pound compared to the dollar or other major currencies. Total exports for the first four months of this year are estimated to have reached LL 1.302 billion (\$302 million), compared to LL 1.21 billion (\$280 million at current rates) in the same period of 1980.

Exports certified by the Beirut Chamber this year stood at LL 221 million (\$51 million) in January, LL 224 million (\$52 million) in February, LL 149 million (\$34.5 million) in March and LL 220 million (\$51 million) in April. The April figure is astonishing given the intensity of the violence in the country that month, when at least 425 people are estimated to have died. The Beirut Chamber of Commerce explains the discrepancy by the hypothesis that exporters may have registered their goods earlier than scheduled in order to ship them out as soon as possible before a further deterioration of security in the country.

C50: 4300/44

## BRIEFS

**ALGERIA TO BUY TOBACCO**--Algeria has agreed to purchase Lebanon's 1981 tobacco crop and negotiations will begin shortly to work out details of the deal, Lebanese Minister of State Mahmoud Ammar announced last week following a meeting with Algeria's Ambassador in Beirut, Moustapha Hachamoui. Lebanon's tobacco production has fallen sharply in recent years, largely as a result of Israeli bombardments in the South, the principal tobacco-growing region. Output was 5,000 tonnes in 1979, the latest year for which figures are available. This was only half of the pre-war production of 10,000 tonnes in 1973. Farmers have also complained about the low prices paid for their tobacco. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 22, 1 Jun 81 p 2]

**TAPLINE SUSPENDS CRUDE DELIVERIES**--The Trans Arabian Pipeline Company (Tapline) has halted deliveries of crude oil to Lebanon from Saudi Arabia, it was revealed last week. Tapline stated in a note to Lebanon's Minister for Industry and Oil Mohammad Younaf Beydoun that it had halted supplies to the refinery at Zahrani, near Sidon, because of an unpaid bill of \$53 million, due on May 15. Suspension of supplies is the latest of a series of difficulties Lebanon has been facing over obtaining oil. The Lebanese government faces an estimated deficit of LL 860 million (about \$215 million) due to oil purchases in 1981 (AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO, May 4 and April 27). Among the reasons for this deficit are subsidies on refined products and the failure of government departments to pay their oil bills. Lebanon's electricity authority is reported to owe Mr Beydoun's ministry LL 900 million (\$223 million). In addition, the government has had to bear operating losses in 1980 of LL 250 million (\$67.5 million) for the country's Tripoli refinery. A prolonged suspension of deliveries from Saudi Arabia could lead to serious shortages of refined products. The Zahrani refinery is reported to hold reserves of 400,000 bbl, sufficient to cover 23 days' consumption, while the Tripoli refinery's reserves of 1 million bbl are enough to cover some 40 to 50 days' consumption. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 22, 1 Jun 81 p 3]

ARAB NASSERITE UNIONIST STUDENTS MEET IN BARCELONA

Paris BULLETIN QUOTIDIEN DE L'AGENCE JAMAHIRYA-PRESS in French No 1115 16 Jun 81  
pp 4-5

[Text] Barcelona, 14 Chaabane, 16 Jun (Jamahirya Press Agency)--During the meeting organised by the League of Arab Nasserite Unionists in Barcelona, a member of the organization gave a speech in which he stressed the historical importance of the achievements of the Al Fatah great revolution, such as the evacuation of the American and British colonialist bases which constituted a hindrance and a danger for the Arab fatherland.

He added that since this evacuation the Jamahirya has not stopped confronting imperialism and colonialism by supporting every national liberation movement and fighting beside the Palestinian resistance and revolution.

The speaker went on to say that this bitter fight led by the Jamahirya has affected imperialism. The latter has not ceased fomenting conspiracies and making threats against the Jamahirya, as it has become certain that the latter is the real force capable of defending the interests of the Arab nation.

The speaker concluded by emphasizing: "We reaffirm our unconditional support for the Al Fatah revolution which is facing up to imperialism."

A member of the People's Committee spoke in turn, stressing basically the revolutionary accomplishments of the Jamahirya which are, he underscored, a real victory for every Arab progressive movement from the Gulf to the Atlantic.

He concluded by saying that the Libyan people, with their national wealth, arms to defend themselves and power, will continue to be the vigilant guardian of the interests of the Arab nation. Under the leadership of the Al Fatah revolution, the Libyan people will continue their fight for the liberation of Arab land.

8143  
C80: 4519/17

## BRIEFS

MISSILE BOATS--The high-speed, missile-launching patrol boat, Bir Ktitat, which was built at the French National Naval Shipyard (ONI), was launched on 22 April, the first of a 10-unit order. Let us recall that these boats were placed under embargo by the former French government of Giscard D'Estaing. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE DEFENSE in French No 39 Jun 81 p 8] 8143

PILOT'S SUSPENSION--The French air company, UTA [Air Transport Union], has announced that, with a view to "calming the situation," lifted the suspension imposed upon the Boeing 747 pilot who in December had refused to transport helicopter blades to Libya. The company said that this will "permit calm examination" by the appropriate authorities of "special or working flights to hostile regions." [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE DEFENSE in French No 39 Jun 81 p 8] 8143

MISRATAH DEMONSTRATION--A demonstration has taken place in Misratah, east of Tripoli, against "U.S. provocations with respect to the Libyan people and the closing of the Libyan People's Office in Washington." The demonstrators said that the recent expulsion of members of the "People's Office" from the American capital "will not change their dedication to the Libyan revolution." [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE DEFENSE in French No 39 Jun 81 p 8] 8143

CSO: 4519/17

PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

MISSILE BASES INSTALLED ALONG BORDER

GPO80701 Paris AFP in English 0649 GMT 8 Jul 81

[Text] Manama, Bahrain, 8 Jul (AFP)--South Yemen has installed missile bases, with Soviet help, along its borders with Oman, North Yemen and Saudi Arabia, the Omani daily paper 'OMAN' reported Tuesday.

In a lengthy report on the Soviet military presence in South Yemen, quoted by the sultanate's news agency Omanpress in a dispatch received here, the paper said Moscow's military aid to Aden had been stepped up since Soviet troops entered Afghanistan.

Oman said that were 2,000 Soviet radar technicians on Socotra Island in the Gulf of Aden on the approaches to the Red Sea.

The Soviets had 1,700 officers and men manning a command headquarters at the naval base at Aden, from where Soviet vessels could operate in the Indian Ocean, the paper said.

It reported fresh construction work at nearby Khormaksar air base for the stationing of 50 Soviet fighter-bombers, which it said were piloted by Cubans as well as Soviets.

The base was the assembly point for flights between the Soviet Union and Ethiopia, according to the paper.

CSO: 4300/42

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

BRIEFS

ARMORED CORPS HOLD EXERCISES--As part of the preparations for the armed forces jubilee anniversary, several units of the armored corps this morning participated in tactical military exercises using live ammunition. Prior to the exercises, those present heard a detailed explanation from the commander of the armored corps on holding the exercises as a fulfillment of the corps' combat training plan. The exercises demonstrated the corps' high fighting capabilities and its efficient use of modern weapons. A responsible source at the political department of the Ministry of Defense spoke about the successes registered by the exercise. The exercise truly expressed the fact that the corps was capable of engaging any hostile force, regardless of its size. [Text] [EA041947 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1630 GMT 4 Jul 81]

FORMER PRESIDENT DIES--The Presidium of the Peoples Supreme Assembly issued a statement today announcing the death of brother Qahtan Mohammad al-Shabi. The deceased was the president of the republic from independence until the corrective step of June 1969. [EA080201 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 7 Jul 81]

CSO: 4304/57

SAUDI ARABIA

FINANCE MINISTER ON GULF CURRENCY

LD041516 Riyadh Domestic Service in Arabic 1130 GMT 4 Jun 81

[Text] Minister of Finance and National Economy Shaykh Muhammad Aba al-Khayl has stressed that the Gulf states are absolutely serious in developing their cooperation to cover all fields, including the monetary field. Everybody will work toward achieving the goal of issuing a unified Gulf currency, even if this means more efforts and waiting.

The finance minister was answering questions put to him by Lebanon's AL-BAYRAQ about whether there is an intention to issue a unified Gulf currency in the wake of the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Replying to another question, he said that the unification of the Gulf states' economic systems is one of the aims stipulated in the unified agreement which was signed at the recent Riyadh meeting of the Gulf finance ministers. What facilitates the unification process is the fact that the Gulf states' economic systems are very much alike as they all follow the free economic system and rely on similar resources, that is, oil. The supreme council of the Gulf Cooperation Council will discuss the collective economic agreement of the finance ministers.

Referring to the position of the dollar and its world strength he expressed the belief that for the dollar to maintain its strength depends to a large extent on the success of the new economic program of U.S. President Ronald Reagan. If this program is unable to achieve its goal or if the United States faces a difficulty in increasing its exports or if the plans for the reduction of gasoline and energy consumption are not realized, the United Staets might experience a period of weakness which might lead to a fall of the dollar.

Replying to a question about whether the money surplus which the Arabs invest in the West has achieved any political results, Shaykh Aba al-Khayl explained that political results are not measures by a specific yardstick, they are the outcome of many factors including the investment of money.

CSO: 4304/57

MILITARY OPPOSITION GROUP FORMED

Paris BULLETIN QUOTIDIEN DE L'AGENCE JAMAHIRYA-PRESS in French No 1120 22 Jun 81 p 6

[Text] London, 17 Chaabane, 19 Jun (Jamahirya News Agency)--A military organization has just been formed under the name of "Military Organization of Officers and Popular Forces to Save the Fatherland."

The organization's office in London issued a statement on this occasion affirming that the Sudan is living under a regime of terror created from start to finish by the intelligence services in disdain of the people's dignity.

The statement adds that the Armed Forces have exposed the isolation of the government, its condemnation by the popular masses, its responsibility for the economy's deterioration and its extreme dependence upon its masters who have transformed the Sudan into a base for American forces.

The statement emphasizes that all these reasons "prompt us to play the role which is our lot, a historical role which is dictated for us by the interests and sovereignty of our people and the Arab nation."

Thus, "We announce the formation of our 'Military Organization of Officers and Popular Forces to Save the Fatherland.'"

The statement adds: "Our objective is to save our country and to guarantee its independence and sovereignty."

The statement concludes by affirming: "We are issuing an appeal to our people, to the intellectuals, to the workers, to the merchants, to the farmers and to the students. We invite them to be vigilant with respect to what the government is plotting against the fatherland."

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CSO: 4519/18

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**July 23, 1981**